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cases that they can reach without knowing a great deal about the people involved and without thinking too much about counter examples obviously the judgments of those people are the best suited to give us a better sense of how people actually use these concepts now part of my point has been that it s not really clear why this needed to be an actual study the researchers had a pretty good solid thought about how people might make judgments about true selves and the study confirmed something that was likely to be pretty obvious anyway the further issue though is that if you want to defend option three as a theory of what the true self is you re going to have to actually provide arguments for it address problems for it etc the experimental results are going to be pretty pointless unless of course all you are trying to show is that people s intuitions tend to track option three in which case you ve got a study that tells you nothing about the true self or what that is but tells you for some as yet unrevealed purpose how a lot of people tend to use the term in a particular experimental set up of course there are ways to make it more interesting for example in expounding option one knobe used the trope of the unwilling addict insofar as she doesn t want to be swayed by her addiction it seems like in acting on her desires she is actually betraying her true self anyone who thinks that the true self lies in a person s desires is going to have to be able to deal with such cases but again i m not clear on what relevance surveys on this would have to philosophical debates on the issue but now let s ask how is option three different from option one in one sense it really isn t on one reading option three just is option one notice that knobe lays out the distinction thus on option one a person s true self is identified with her reflective judgment as knobe puts it in pointing out the problems with options one and two the trouble is that both of them assume that the true self can be identified in some straightforward way with one particular part of a person s psychology this is confusing because i don t see a good way of making option one identify the true self with one particular part of a person s psychology the capacity for rational reflection isn t straightforwardly such a part and in any case what knobe s explanation seems to suggest in line with the endorsement account is that the person s true self isn t the capacity as such but rather the piece of the person s psychology that that capacity picks out so on option one a person s true self isn t just some piece of psychology rather it s the piece of psychology that is supported by reflection i e by endorsement or valuation and on option three judgments about a person s true self constitute a judgment not about which aspect of a person s psychology serves that role but rather about which part of the person s psychology has greater value so option one looks a heck of a lot like option three of course this is only on one reading of option one here is another and seems to get closer to what knobe is driving at option one makes judgments about what the person s true self is depend on that person s psychology option three on the other hand makes those judgments relative to the values not of the person in question but of the person doing the judging so i don t see at all how this survey as knobe describes it shows us anything opposed to either option one or option two instead it changes the topic it shows that our judgments track a different option it shows that when we have to make snap decisions about someone s true self on the basis of scant information something we do in real life we are tempted to make those decisions on the basis of our values this might say something interesting about our moral psychology no doubt but it says very little about the concept of the true self so knobe seems to set up the motivation for the survey by talking about one thing and then carrying out the survey on a different topic that doesn t seem enlightening here s what would be enlightening and what would be worth seeing in a philosophical discussion of the true self written for a popular audience an actual examination of the confused common sense view of the concept first we might note that option two is obviously not absent from the tradition although few philosophers have held it as is and for a good reason if you re going to give all our desires equal weight it s not going to make a hell of a lot of sense for you to talk about a true self in the first place you d have to see the self as a multiplicity of varied disconnected often conflicting and incoherent desires but if you do give desires a central place in constituting the self you re likely going to establish some sort of hierarchy so that some desires say volitional necessities have a special place and other desires ones that conflict with the volitional necessities are going to be in some sense alienated or external desires there is a second point worth making about option two one that comes up nicely in existentialist take downs of the idea that being authentic or true to yourself just involves acting on your desires or even finding your deep desires and acting on those namely that your desires are no more you than whatever social norms you absorb this is in part because many of our desires on some views all of them just are socially constructed or shaped maybe you really want to get married and have a nice picket fence and a three car garage and a bunch of toddlers running around but you have to be crazy to think that this desire is any more authentic or any more yours than say an ad induced craving for sprite and in part there s the kantian point that while you might think that your desires show the true you it s hard to see why this you is something you should be particularly attached to if your desires aren t things that constitute you because you value them or because you chose them or because you created them in some way then why should you give them any privileged place how are they any more you or any more valuable to you than any other natural feature about you like that ingrown toenail but now and this is one of the important things to note knobe points out without examining that this idea of a true or authentic self is perhaps one of the distinctive ideals of modern life well yeah it really is it s one of those things the post kantian revolt against reason managed to bring out and merge nicely with the obsessive modern western trend toward individualism bolstered by our now common belief that we are all so very special and so gosh darn unique and sure if you think you re a special unique individual and that this really matters then it s going to suddenly be very important to figure out just what your unique individuality consists of but this desire to be unique and special may well exercise a distorting influence on our judgments about what our true self is and critique of this is in fact pretty common to the tradition let s revisit option one on which the true self is identified with the capacity for rational reflection what does that really mean well on one popular historical view the capacity is universal in that it is a capacity shared by all rational beings it is a capacity for rational reflection and reason is universal in fact all that stuff about individuality is on this view problematic we deviate from the universal just to the extent that we deviate from reason and we do so insofar as we are misled by our desires and our sense perceptions and why would anybody value that in one sense it is a tautology to say that valuing deviation from reason is an error it s just saying that it is irrational to value deviating from reason so on this view and we find various approaches to it in plato aristotle maimonides and kant your true self is exactly the same as everybody else s true self it s the self that is aligned with reason or truth from this vantage point the different views about the true self that knobe is discussing are all completely off the mark it s also no wonder that people who are raised to think of themselves as unique individuals are likely to be systematically off the mark in this way in a sense whatever the survey respondents might say may be just as indicative of a widespread pathology as any insight into our concepts and diagnosing such pathologies is isn t it one of the key functions of philosophy what does x phi contribute continue reading at 11 32 pm 2 comments friday april 22 2011 cfp time and agency posted by roman altshuler call for papers time and agency george washington university november 18 19 2011 invited speakers j david velleman new york university lynne rudder baker university of massachusetts amherst shaun gallagher university of central florida john j drummond fordham university actions have a duration they sometimes follow on intentions directed toward the future and are themselves sometimes directed toward bringing about future events they may also be caused by past events or be brought on by motives or reasons actions are also individuated from within a temporally extended continuous stream of activity they are performed by agents whose selves or practical identities may or may not be unified through psychological continuity through their standing plans for the future or through narratives agents inhabit a world that is temporally ordered and that ordering is reflected in action in seeing themselves as standing under an obligation agents recognize reasons for future actions and in judging them responsible for those actions we in turn trace their agency to past decisions on their part whatever perspective one takes on the above issues it is clear that action and agency cannot be understood apart from time we are soliciting strong papers in both the analytic and continental traditions papers will ideally be written in a manner that will be clear and accessible to scholars from different backgrounds working on the philosophy of action possible topics include but are not limited to causal and teleological theories of action action individuation within a stream of activity future directed intention intention in action and the temporality of directions of fit plans personal policies and other diachronic volitional states diachronic personal identity practical identity continuity and narrative historical and time slice views of moral responsibility temporality movement and the life world temporal aspects of free will determinism and fatalism narrative time and the explanation of action retention and protention in agency heidegger on conscience being toward death or the relation between mood and action ricoeur on birth life character habit and consent to the involuntary psychoanalysis on deferred action please send papers or abstracts for a talk of approximately 40 minutes ideally submissions should not be under review for publication abstracts should be around 1 500 words although complete papers with a brief abstract will receive priority in consideration please include a short cv or author bio these will be used to interest possible publishers and will not be involved in selection of papers for the conference abstracts papers bios and correspondence should be sent to the conference organizers michael sigrist msigrist gwu edu and roman altshuler raltshul ic sunysb edu please indicate with your submission whether you would be willing to serve as a commentator deadline for submissions july 1 decisions will be sent out by august 31 sponsored by the george washington university department of philosophy continue reading at 6 55 pm 0 comments tuesday march 29 2011 naive action theory first replies posted by michael sigrist roman has some of the same questions i have i ll leave 1 until chapter 8 action and time i think i know the answer to 2 but then again thompson s larger points get lost on me if i m not paying sustained concentration which is often enough that well thompson s larger points get lost on me at times roman s question as i understand it is as follows but broken up a sometimes we rationalize explain an action by reference to another action why are you going to chicago answer because i m traveling to evanston but other times we don t why are you eating that answer because i m hungry being hungry isn t an action nor is it a wanting desiring but it is more easily explicable in those terms eg i want to sate my hunger and believe that eating this will so sate and so i sate myself b what is the relation between the trip to evanston and the trip to chicago going to chicago appears at the same time to be both dependent and independent on the trip to evanston on a trip to evanston it would make sense to tell a friend i went to chicago as for a i still have to wait and see thompson has yet to deliver from what i ve read on the claim that a sophisticated position sat cannot be defended and that the role played by wanting really is taken up by what we might call the progress of the deed itself 90 i am intrigued by his suggestion on page 92 that we might build up from nat to an sat much like sellars jones graduates from the rylean world to mind reading this seems promising and i m looking forward to seeing if thompson can deliver that said with respect to the sellarsian parallel it s worth reminding ourselves of the difference between explanatory and conceptual priority as they figure in sellars argumentative strategy overt behaviors among the ryleans have conceptual priority to nonexpressed nonovert mental states in the sense that a they can be described independently of mental talk and b they provide the model for mental states as theoretical posits however once the theory is online as it were mental episodes have an explanatory priority for behavior behavior is explained as resulting from inner mental states maybe more to the point sellars believed that there really are mental states but thompson seems to be telling us that wantings intendings are really taken up by what we might call the progress of the deed itself i can t yet make sense of that so the analogy potentially breaks down here for sellars thinkings are modelled on speech acts but inner states motivating actions can t be modeled on the actions themselves and so i don t see how naive actions can play the explanatory role that overt speech acts play for sellars also thompson claims again much like the ryleans that we can conceive of a form of life that explains itself solely in a naive fashion like roman i m a little skeptical of this but withholding judgment i think we have to withhold judgment because if thompson fails to deliver on this claim then really his whole project fails it would turn out that he is just analyzing a peculiar sub species of action rationalization rather than action itself which leads to b naive rationalization explains smaller phases of an action by placing them in mereological fashion in a larger whole ...
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