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that there exists a possible world where x is true to say x is necessary is to say that in all possible worlds x is true the appeal to possible worlds provides a sort of economy with the least number of undefined primitives axioms in our ontology taking this latter point one step further lewis argues that modality cannot be made sense of without such a reduction he maintains that we cannot determine that x is possible without a conception of what a real world where x holds would look like in deciding whether it is possible for basketballs to be inside of atoms we do not simply make a linguistic determination of whether the proposition is grammatically coherent we actually think about whether a real world would be able to sustain such a state of affairs thus we require a brand of modal realism if we are to use modality at all argument from ways edit an often cited argument is called the argument from ways it defines possible worlds as ways how things could have been and relies for its premises and inferences on assumptions from natural language 13 14 15 for example 1 hillary clinton could have won the 2016 us election 2 so there are other ways how things could have been 3 possible worlds are ways how things could have been 4 so there are other possible worlds the central step of this argument happens at 2 where the plausible 1 is interpreted in a way that involves quantification over ways many philosophers following willard van orman quine 16 hold that quantification entails ontological commitments in this case a commitment to the existence of possible worlds quine himself restricted his method to scientific theories but others have applied it also to natural language for example amie l thomasson in her easy approach to ontology 17 the strength of the argument from ways depends on these assumptions and may be challenged by casting doubt on the quantifier method of ontology or on the reliability of natural language as a guide to ontology criticisms edit a number of philosophers including lewis himself have produced criticisms of what some call extreme realism about possible worlds peter forrest argues that modal realism gives us reason to doubt the method of induction as according to modal realism there is a world where we are deceived by our senses and we may be in this world 18 james f ross argues that when lewis states that counterfactual utterances are true in the sense that it is the case in another world that such a thing occurred he parses away our counterfactual utterances into what we do not mean 19 hilary putnam likewise writes one doesn t have to think of a way the world could have been as another world and asks why one couldn t say that a way the world could be is just a property a characteristic however complicated that the whole world could have had rather than another world of the same sort as our own 20 lewis s own critique edit lewis s own extended presentation of the theory on the plurality of worlds 1986 raises and then counters several lines of argument against it that work introduces not only the theory but its reception among philosophers the many objections that continue to be published are typically variations on one or other of the lines that lewis has already canvassed here are some of the major categories of objection catastrophic counterintuitiveness the theory does not accord with our deepest intuitions about reality this is sometimes called the incredulous stare since it lacks argumentative content and is merely an expression of the affront that the theory represents to common sense philosophical and pre philosophical orthodoxy lewis is concerned to support the deliverances of common sense in general common sense is a settled body of theory unsystematic folk theory which at any rate we do believe and i presume that we are reasonable to believe it most of it 1986 p 134 but most of it is not all of it otherwise there would be no place for philosophy at all and lewis finds that reasonable argument and the weight of such considerations as theoretical efficiency compel us to accept modal realism the alternatives he argues at length can themselves be shown to yield conclusions offensive to our modal intuitions inflated ontology some 21 object that modal realism postulates vastly too many entities compared with other theories it is therefore they argue vulnerable to occam s razor according to which we should prefer all things being equal those theories that postulate the smallest number of entities lewis s reply is that all things are not equal and in particular competing accounts of possible worlds themselves postulate more classes of entities since there must be not only one real concrete world the actual world but many worlds of a different class altogether abstract in some way or other too many worlds this is perhaps a variant of the previous category but it relies on appeals to mathematical propriety rather than occamist principles some argue that lewis s principles of worldmaking means by which we might establish the existence of further worlds by recombination of parts of worlds we already think exist are too permissive so permissive are they that the total number of worlds must exceed what is mathematically coherent lewis allows that there are difficulties and subtleties to address on this front 1986 pp 89 90 daniel nolan recombination unbound philosophical studies 1996 vol 84 pp 239 262 mounts a sustained argument against certain forms of the objection but variations on it continue to appear island universes on the version of his theory that lewis strongly favours each world is distinct from every other world by being spatially and temporally isolated from it some have objected that a world in which spatio temporally isolated universes island universes coexist is therefore not possible by lewis s theory see for example bigelow john and pargetter robert beyond the blank stare theoria 1987 vol 53 pp 97 114 lewis s awareness of this difficulty discomforted him but he could have replied that other means of distinguishing worlds may be available or alternatively that sometimes there will inevitably be further surprising and counterintuitive consequences beyond what we had thought we would be committed to at the start of our investigation but this fact in itself is hardly surprising alvin plantinga also wonders why we would think that possibility is grounded in some other multi verse counterpart to me if we were to discover other universes if not then why think the same would apply to possible worlds as a whole 22 finally some of these objections can be combined for example one 23 can think that modal realism is unnecessary because multiverse theory can do all the modal work e g many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics 23 a pervasive theme in lewis s replies to the critics of modal realism is the use of tu quoque argument your account would fail in just the same way that you claim mine would a major heuristic virtue of lewis s theory is that it is sufficiently definite for objections to gain some foothold but these objections once clearly articulated can then be turned equally against other theories of the ontology and epistemology of possible worlds stalnaker s response edit robert stalnaker while he finds some merit in lewis s account of possible worlds finds the position to be ultimately untenable he himself advances a more moderate realism about possible worlds which he terms actualism since it holds that all that exists is in fact actual and that there are no merely possible entities 24 in particular stalnaker does not accept lewis s attempt to argue on the basis of a supposed analogy with the epistemological objection to mathematical platonism that believing in possible worlds as lewis imagines them is no less reasonable than believing in mathematical entities such as sets or functions 25 kripke s response edit saul kripke described modal realism as totally misguided wrong and objectionable 26 kripke argued that possible worlds were not like distant countries out there to be discovered rather we stipulate what is true according to them kripke also criticized modal realism for its reliance on counterpart theory which he regarded as untenable specifically kripke states that lewis modal realism implies that when we refer to possibilities regarding persons like you or me we re not referring to you or me instead we re referring to counterparts who are similar to us but not identical this seems problematic because it seems like when for example we say that humphrey could have become president we are talking about humphrey and we re not talking about a person that is like humphrey 27 lewis responds by saying this objection i e the humphrey objection wouldn t apply to modal realists who believe that the identity of persons can overlap in multiple worlds even though lewis thinks that view is problematic 28 secondly lewis doesn t seem to share the intuition that there is any problem as evidenced by the fact that he calls it an alleged intuition 29 argument from morality edit the argument from morality as initially formulated by robert merrihew adams 30 criticizes modal realism on the grounds that modal realism has very implausible consequences for morality and should therefore be rejected this can be seen by considering the principle of plenitude the thesis that there is a possible world for every way things could be 31 32 the consequence of this principle is that the nature of the pluriverse i e of reality in the widest sense is fixed this means that whatever choices human agents make they have no impact on reality as a whole 18 for example assume that during a stroll at a lake you spot a drowning child not far from the shore you have a choice to save the child or not if you choose to save the child then a counterpart of you at another possible world chooses to let it drown if you choose to let it drown then the counterpart of you at this other possible world chooses to save it either way the result for these two possible worlds is the same one child drowns and the other is saved the only impact of your choice is to relocate a death from the actual world to another possible world 33 but since according to modal realism there is no important difference between the actual world and other possible worlds this shouldn t matter the consequence would be that there is no moral obligation to save the child which is drastically at odds with common sense morality worse still this argument can be generalized to any decision so whatever you choose in any decision would be morally permissible 34 david lewis defends modal realism against this argument by pointing out that morality as commonly conceived is only interested in the actual world specifically that the actual agent doesn t do evil so the argument from morality would only be problematic for an odd version of utilitarianism aiming at maximizing the sum total of good throughout the plurality of worlds 35 but as mark heller points out this reply doesn t explain why we are justified in morally privileging the actual world as modal realism seems to be precisely against such a form of unequal treatment this is not just a problem for utilitarians but for any moral theory that is sensitive to how other people are affected by one s actions in the widest sense causally or otherwise the modal realist has to consider more people in moral decision making than we ordinarily do consider 33 bob fischer speaking on lewis behalf concedes that from a modally unrestricted point of view of morality there is no obligation to save the child from drowning common sense morality on the other hand assumes a modally restricted point of view according to fischer this disagreement with common sense is a cost of modal realism to be considered in an overall cost benefit calculation but it is no knockdown argument 34 see also edit linguistic modality many worlds interpretation mathematical universe hypothesis modal logic time plays everything everywhere all at once references edit lewis david 1986 on the plurality of worlds oxford england blackwell p 2 1 2 possible worlds the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy metaphysics research lab stanford university 2021 1 2 lewis david 1986 on the plurality of worlds wiley blackwell platonism in metaphysics the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy metaphysics research lab stanford university 2016 david lewis convention 1968 p 208 david lewis counterfactuals 1973 pp 87 88 1 2 yagisawa takashi 2009 worlds and individuals possible and otherwise oxford university press 1 2 yagisawa takashi 2011 précis of worlds and individuals possible and otherwise analytic philosophy 52 4 270 272 doi 10 1111 j 2153 960x 2011 00534 x thomas andrew d 2020 extended modal realism a new solution to the problem of intentional inexistence philosophia 48 3 1197 1208 doi 10 1007 s11406 019 00126 z sider theodore 2001 four dimensionalism an ontology of persistence and time oxford university press vacek martin 2017 extended modal dimensionalism acta analytica 32 1 13 28 doi 10 1007 s12136 016 0297 9 s2cid 114272096 berto francesco jago mark 2018 impossible worlds the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy metaphysics research lab stanford university laan david a vander 1997 the ontology of impossible worlds notre dame journal of formal logic 38 4 597 620 doi 10 1305 ndjfl 1039540772 berto francesco jago mark 2018 impossible worlds the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy metaphysics research lab stanford university retrieved 14 november 2020 menzel christopher 2017 possible worlds the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy metaphysics research lab stanford university retrieved 14 november 2020 quine willard v 1948 on what there is review of metaphysics 2 1 21 38 thomasson amie l 2014 ontology made easy oup usa p 248 1 2 weatherson brian 2016 david lewis the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy metaphysics research lab stanford university retrieved 15 november 2020 ross james f the crash of modal metaphysics the review of metaphysics vol 43 no 2 1989 pp 251 279 putnam hilary 1995 renewing philosophy harvard university press p 138 w v o quine proportional objects in ontological relativity and other essays 1969 pp 140 147 plantinga a 2003 essays on the metaphysics of modality m davidson ed oxford england oxford university press 1 2 wilson alastair 2020 the nature of contingency quantum physics as modal realism oxford uk oxford university press stalnaker 1976 1996 both reprinted in stalnaker 2003 stalnaker 1996 kripke 1972 saul kripke naming and necessity harvard university press 1980 lewis david 1986 on the plurality of worlds wiley blackwell pp 196 197 lewis david 1986 on the plurality of worlds wiley blackwell pp 197 198 adams robert merrihew 1974 theories of actuality noûs 8 3 211 231 doi 10 2307 2214751 jstor 2214751 bricker phillip 2006 david lewis on the plurality of worlds central works of philosophy vol 5 the twentieth century 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