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that they aren t called since most of the people voting most likely don t read continental philosophy in the first place sigh i actually did look through the toc s of the journals listed for the past few years so i think my assessment of the current tally namely that those voting mostly don t read continental philosophy has to be accurate since most of the journals leiter lists haven t published a single continental paper paper in the past two years or perhaps only a single continental paper so it s hard to imagine what this exercise is supposed to prove unless leiter is literally looking for confirmation that good continental philosophy is done only in analytic contexts the contest seems a little rigged though for those who have difficulty with online sarcasm by the way i take it that ejp and inquiry are obviously the two best journals in the category ppr on the other hand has no reason to be there despite recently publishing katsafanas s awesome article on nietzsche and constitutivism that only shows that ppr will occasionally publish good papers not that it s any more a reasonable place to go look for scholarship in continental philosophy than nyu is a reasonable place to go study continental philosophy continue reading at 8 49 pm 1 comments tuesday april 10 2012 belated note on gutting on the analytic continental divide posted by roman altshuler i m guessing everyone who might read this blog caught gutting s piece on bridging the analytic continental divide when it first appeared in the stone way back i m a fan of gutting generally but have to say that something about this piece didn t quite work for me if gutting is right about what continental philosophy is about in any case it seems like it can t be written more clearly that s upsetting the problem is this if as gutting says there is a powerful current of continental philosophy that tries to think what is impossible and for that matter if the aim of phenomenology is to get beneath the concepts of common sense and find their conditions of possibility it seems to follow that much continental philosophy cannot be written clearly what is impossible to think in principle cannot be thought clearly and whatever involves expanding or getting beneath our concepts cannot be clearly thought until it has become common sense that is until our conceptual apparatus has managed to absorb it incidentally this is why i m a bit confused by gutting s suggestion that the phenomenological and post phenomenological approaches the philosophies of experience and imagination as he terms them are in tension with each other so if one takes these continental tasks to be worthwhile then one cannot simply say that continental thinkers need to write more clearly so analytic thinkers can understand them rather if these tasks really are worthwhile then analytic philosophers must get better at understanding them on their own terms or at least they must meet halfway for that matter what are we to make of the claim that not much of serious philosophical value is lost in the clarity of analytic commentaries on heidegger derrida et al i can t speak about derrida et al but quite a bit is lost in most analytic commentaries on heidegger that i ve read temporality for example of course continental commentaries have their own serious problems why would you need a commentary on heidegger that is even more opaque than the original this is exactly why it s generally important to read original sources of course i applaud gutting s pragmatic streak here it s better for analytic philosophers to read analytic commentaries on the continentals than not to read them at all the problem is that we can t tell what is lost without checking for ourselves but the more significant problem remains this that if gutting is right about what is truly valuable in continental philosophy i can t see how it could be made clear and while i agree with his insistence that continental philosophy could and should be more clearly written i can t see how that could be possible given his characterization of it and speaking of the stone our most recent disaster is julian friedland making a mockery of the pretty obvious from a semantic standpoint anyway claim that philosophy is not a science another one of critchley s friends who still thinks that psychologists can work from armchairs with their eyes closed post 19th century really ending on a more positive note iskra fileva s recent piece on character and its discontents was good though i worry slightly that she might be conflating two senses of character that really should be sharply distinguished the sense in which having a character means resisting external influences or more felicitously maintaining one s way of behaving despite external incentives to deviate and the sense in which having a character just means being disposed to respond to external influences otherwise known as motives i hope she gets that essay prize continue reading at 11 09 pm 0 comments labels philosophy thursday january 5 2012 apa savings posted by roman altshuler from a recent ihe article about the smoker at the apa for background on the most recent criticisms of the smoker see here apa executive director david schrader noted the concerns of some women and said there had been informal discussions at the apa some had suggested a cash bar instead of free alcohol as a way of tempering bad behavior by making it a bit difficult to drink too much seriously their plan is to save money on alcohol keep in mind that this year the only free alcoholic alternatives were budweiser and bud light and spin it as a way of being more welcoming to women in philosophy does anybody else find this suspicious continue reading at 4 49 pm 1 comments thursday september 15 2011 personal identity duplication and divine justice posted by roman altshuler one standard criticism of the memory or virtually any psychological continuity account of personal identity is that it is vulnerable to duplication if person a is somehow duplicated so that the resulting persons are b and c and both have a s memories and are otherwise psychologically continuous with a this shows that psychological continuity cannot be the bearer of personal identity after all in this case b would be identical with a and c would be identical with a so by the transitivity of identity b would be identical with c but since b and c are ex hypothesi two distinct persons they cannot both be the same person as a i have never found this argument convincing or relevant it seems to me to miss what personal identity is about because same person doesn t mean same variable and personal identity involves temporal considerations that the duplication argument simply ignores if we want to insist on using personal identity for a formal atemporal relation my sense is that parfit is right personal identity isn t a real property to begin with and we should switch to a different word that will be less confusing to metaphysicians but i was just reading lynne rudder baker s summary of gareth matthews religiously motivated attempt to save the memory criterion and it strikes me as completely off track let s hope psychological continuity theorists don t need to appeal to intuitions this vague i haven t read mathews argument but only baker s short summary of it presumably he defends some of his premises though i can t imagine how here i will just quote baker s summary in full from her death and the afterlife p 380 there is no citation for mathews so i m not sure where he discusses this the reason it would be metaphysically impossible for b and c to have a s memories is this a deserves punishment god is essentially just and judges everyone suppose that b and c both had a s memories caused in the right way whom does god punish if god punished b but not c or c but not b then god would not be essentially just b and c are related to a in exactly the same way it is impossible to be just and to judge b and c differently on the other hand if god punished both b and c then there would be twice the punishment that a deserved and again god would not be essentially just either way supposing that b and c both had a s memories caused in the right way violates god s essential justice in judgment because god is essentially just if a deserves punishment it is metaphysically impossible for god to bring it about that b and c both have a s memories now there are all sorts of problems the reliance on theological premises for example or on the idea that despite being a loving god he is preoccupied with making sure everyone gets to suffer for their sins i ve always wondered how much of the psychological pull towards such views is about love and how much pace nietzsche is just about sticking it to the people you don t like but here it s the conception of justice i don t buy i get that if god is all about punishing it would be unjust of him to punish b but not c sure ok both of them deserve it equally though pace anselm this time we could insist that god doesn t necessarily punish everyone based exclusively on their desert since god must also be just to himself and we don t have any idea how that works i m pretty sure anselm s view of divine justice would undermine this prong of the dilemma but i m willing to accept this it s the second prong that smells fishy if god punishes both b and c then there would be twice the punishment that a deserved and again god would not be essentially just wait come again this seems to me obviously and trivially wrong at best first there seems to be something very weird going on the argument assumes that there is a fixed ratio between the amount of guilt and the amount of appropriate punishment so if say someone commits crime x which deserves y amount of punishment then it would be unjust to meet out more or less i suppose than y amount of punishment but this can t be the whole story for surely if a commits crime x it would be unjust to meet out y amount of punishment to z a completely different person so it matters not simply how much punishment is meted out but to whom it is meted out the right person has to be punished and that person is a so on the argument as given it seems like there are two criteria in play 1 punishment must be meted out to the person who deserves it and 2 the amount of punishment for crime x in the universe must be proportional to the severity of crime x now 2 may be a modification of a reasonable assumption 3 the amount of punishment must be proportional to the severity of the crime but 3 is perfectly compatible with duplication if both b and c are psychologically continuous with a then both b and c deserve the amount of punishment proportional to a s crime the difference between 2 and 3 should be clear enough 3 insists that everyone get what they deserve but no more but 2 insist that in the universe as a whole there not be meted out more than the number of people who initially deserved it now deserve in other words the assumption of 2 is that if only one person committed crime x deserving y punishment then at any time after x is committed only y and no more may be justly doled out in the universe but i haven t got a clue why we should believe that it makes sense of course to say with 3 that if a committed crime x which deserves y punishment then it would be unjust to punish a with more than y but if as we are assuming a is split into b and c where both remember committing the crime both remember thinking beforehand about the consequences etc i can see no reason why y punishment would not be appropriate to each person who committed the crime why should the universe demand if one person committed a crime but now two people stand in that one person s place that only one of them may be punished whatever the idea behind this it doesn t seem to me to be related to any conception of justice perhaps the idea is this since only one person committed the crime only one person may be punished this is still dubious but it s also irrelevant if at the time of crime x one person committed the crime but now there are two people responsible to insist that only one of them deserves punishment would be question begging the argument must assume it seems to me that two people cannot both be the same as one person that used to be perhaps that isn t question begging the argument isn t supposed to show that if a is duplicated into b and c then b and c are not identical with a the argument simply assumes this it is supposed to show only that god could not allow both b and c to be duplicates of a but that isn t right if b and c were both duplicates of a but were not the same person then there would be no problem here at all because neither b nor c would deserve punishment so in that case god would have no reason to prevent the duplication he would have reason to prevent the duplication only if b and c in fact were the same person as a but then it seems perfectly reasonable to think that both b and c deserve the punishment for a s crime since it is also b s crime and c s crime so mathews argument is either question begging or involves saddling justice with a weird assumption that is foreign to the idea of justice since it isn t germane to the issue of what punishment anyone who committed a crime deserves continue reading at 12 29 am 0 comments wednesday july 27 2011 why bother talking to analytic philosophers posted by roman altshuler continental philosophers interested in communicating with their analytic analytic counterparts sometimes express frustration why should they have to do all the work it sometimes seems as if in such situations continental philosophers have to completely translate someone like heidegger into analytic speak and then relate the translation to clear current problems in the analytic literature that s a lot of work and for what to get people who refuse to read heidegger obstinately it seems to accept that yes maybe heidegger had one good idea somewhere at least that s what it can look like and in light of this it isn t surprising that so many continental philosophers want to retreat into an echo chamber of textual exegesis why bother to explain something one might ask to people who seem to have no interest in what you re explaining and who certainly won t meet you halfway but expect you to come to them this isn t helped by the fact that some analytic philosophers though i think significantly fewer than one might expect are actively hostile to continental thought consider for example this missive on heidegger by simon blackburn who seems to have skimmed heidegger for the explicit purpose of criticizing him to balance things it may be worth noting that blackburn did something similar with regard to donald davidson though i m not sure how comparable that hatchet job is or perhaps even worse paul edwards s seemingly intentional misreading of heidegger there are few authors one can t perversely misread if one sets one s mind to it and if one s colleagues will praise rather...
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