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obfuscated files or information stripped payloads sub technique t1027 008 enterprise mitre att ck matrices enterprise mobile ics tactics enterprise mobile ics techniques enterprise mobile ics defenses mitigations enterprise mobile ics assets detections detection strategies analytics data components cti groups software campaigns resources get started learn more about att ck att ck advisory council att ckcon att ck data tools faq engage with att ck version history updates legal branding benefactors contribute blog search att ckcon 7 0 in person tickets are open join us october 27 28 2026 in mclean va register here for in person tickets hotel and location details can be found in the faq home techniques enterprise obfuscated files or information stripped payloads obfuscated files or information stripped payloads other sub techniques of obfuscated files or information 18 id name t1027 001 binary padding t1027 002 software packing t1027 003 steganography t1027 004 compile after delivery t1027 005 indicator removal from tools t1027 006 html smuggling t1027 007 dynamic api resolution t1027 008 stripped payloads t1027 009 embedded payloads t1027 010 command obfuscation t1027 011 fileless storage t1027 012 lnk icon smuggling t1027 013 encrypted encoded file t1027 014 polymorphic code t1027 015 compression t1027 016 junk code insertion t1027 017 svg smuggling t1027 018 invisible unicode adversaries may attempt to make a payload difficult to analyze by removing symbols strings and other human readable information scripts and executables may contain variables names and other strings that help developers document code functionality symbols are often created by an operating system s linker when executable payloads are compiled reverse engineers use these symbols and strings to analyze code and to identify functionality in payloads 1 2 adversaries may use stripped payloads in order to make malware analysis more difficult for example compilers and other tools may provide features to remove or obfuscate strings and symbols adversaries have also used stripped payload formats such as run only applescripts a compiled and stripped version of applescript to evade detection and analysis the lack of human readable information may directly hinder detection and analysis of payloads 3 id t1027 008 sub technique of t1027 ⓘ tactic stealth ⓘ platforms linux network devices windows macos version 2 0 created 29 september 2022 last modified 12 may 2026 version permalink live version procedure examples id name description s1153 cuckoo stealer cuckoo stealer is a stripped binary payload 4 5 s1048 macos osaminer macos osaminer has used run only applescripts a compiled and stripped version of applescript to remove human readable indicators to evade detection 3 mitigations this type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features detection strategy id name analytic id analytic description det0019 detection strategy for stripped payloads across platforms an0055 executable or script payloads lacking symbol information and readable strings that are created or dropped by unusual or short lived processes an0056 executable or binary files created without symbol tables or with stripped sections especially by non user shell processes or compilers invoked outside standard dev paths an0057 creation of run only applescripts or mach o binaries lacking symbol table and string references especially when dropped by user space scripting engines or staging apps an0058 inbound binary payloads transferred over http s with compressed or encoded headers lacking signature markers or metadata indicative of compiler toolchain references stephen eckels 2022 february 28 ready set go golang internals and symbol recovery retrieved september 29 2022 ignacio sanmillan 2018 february 7 executable and linkable format 101 part 2 symbols retrieved september 29 2022 phil stokes 2021 january 11 fade dead adventures in reversing malicious run only applescripts retrieved september 29 2022 kohler a and lopez c 2024 april 30 malware cuckoo behaves like cross between infostealer and spyware retrieved august 20 2024 stokes p 2024 may 9 macos cuckoo stealer ensuring detection and defense as new samples rapidly emerge retrieved august 20 2024 core objects all core att ck objects all none matrices tactics techniques sub techniques defenses all defenses all none mitigations assets detection strategies analytics data components cti all cti all none groups software campaigns reference all reference all none resources domains all domains all none enterprise mobile ics reset filters contact us terms of use privacy policy website changelog cookie preferences 2015 2026 the mitre corporation mitre att ck and att ck are registered trademarks of the mitre corporation
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