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hijack execution flow path interception by path environment variable sub technique t1574 007 enterprise mitre att ck matrices enterprise mobile ics tactics enterprise mobile ics techniques enterprise mobile ics defenses mitigations enterprise mobile ics assets detections detection strategies analytics data components cti groups software campaigns resources get started learn more about att ck att ck advisory council att ckcon att ck data tools faq engage with att ck version history updates legal branding benefactors contribute blog search att ckcon 7 0 in person tickets are open join us october 27 28 2026 in mclean va register here for in person tickets hotel and location details can be found in the faq home techniques enterprise hijack execution flow path interception by path environment variable hijack execution flow path interception by path environment variable other sub techniques of hijack execution flow 12 id name t1574 001 dll t1574 004 dylib hijacking t1574 005 executable installer file permissions weakness t1574 006 dynamic linker hijacking t1574 007 path interception by path environment variable t1574 008 path interception by search order hijacking t1574 009 path interception by unquoted path t1574 010 services file permissions weakness t1574 011 services registry permissions weakness t1574 012 cor_profiler t1574 013 kernelcallbacktable t1574 014 appdomainmanager adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries the path environment variable contains a list of directories user and system that the os searches sequentially through in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line adversaries can place a malicious program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the path environment variable resulting in the operating system executing the malicious binary rather than the legitimate binary when it searches sequentially through that path listing for example on windows if an adversary places a malicious program named net exe in c example path which by default precedes c windows system32 net exe in the path environment variable when net is executed from the command line the c example path will be called instead of the system s legitimate executable at c windows system32 net exe some methods of executing a program rely on the path environment variable to determine the locations that are searched when the path for the program is not given such as executing programs from a command and scripting interpreter 1 adversaries may also directly modify the path variable specifying the directories to be searched an adversary can modify the path variable to point to a directory they have write access when a program using the path variable is called the os searches the specified directory and executes the malicious binary on macos this can also be performed through modifying the home variable these variables can be modified using the command line launchctl unix shell configuration modification or modifying the etc paths d folder contents 2 3 4 id t1574 007 sub technique of t1574 ⓘ tactics stealth execution ⓘ platforms linux windows macos contributors stefan kanthak version 2 0 created 13 march 2020 last modified 12 may 2026 version permalink live version procedure examples id name description s9015 brickstorm brickstorm has checked hard coded paths of etc sysconfig or etc sysconfig network prior to execution and loading file contents from that path 5 s1111 darkgate darkgate overrides the windir environment variable by setting a registry key hkey_current_user environment windir to an alternate command to execute a malicious autoit script this allows darkgate to run every time the scheduled task diskcleanup is executed as this uses the path value windir system32 cleanmgr exe for execution 6 s0363 empire empire contains modules that can discover and exploit path interception opportunities in the path environment variable 7 s0194 powersploit powersploit contains a collection of privesc powerup modules that can discover and exploit path interception opportunities in the path environment variable 8 9 mitigations id mitigation description m1047 audit find and eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files scripts the path environment variable services and in shortcuts by surrounding path variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them be aware of the search order windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate clean up old windows registry keys when software is uninstalled to avoid keys with no associated legitimate binaries periodically search for and correct or report path interception weaknesses on systems that may have been introduced using custom or available tools that report software using insecure path configurations 10 11 12 m1038 execution prevention adversaries will likely need to place new binaries in locations to be executed through this weakness identify and block potentially malicious software executed path interception by using application control tools like windows defender application control applocker or software restriction policies where appropriate 13 14 15 16 17 18 m1022 restrict file and directory permissions ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top level directory c and system directories such as c windows to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution require that all executables be placed in write protected directories detection strategy id name analytic id analytic description det0004 detection strategy for hijack execution flow using path interception by path environment variable an0009 abnormal modification of the path environment variable or registry keys controlling system paths combined with execution of binaries named after legitimate system tools from user writable directories defender correlates registry modifications file creation of suspicious binaries and process execution paths inconsistent with baseline system directories an0010 user modification of the path environment variable in shell configuration files or direct runtime path changes followed by execution of binaries from user controlled directories defender observes file edits to bashrc profile or etc paths d and process execution resolving to unexpected binary locations an0011 modification of path or home environment variables through shell config files launchctl or etc paths d entries combined with process execution from attacker controlled directories defender correlates file changes in etc paths d with process execution resolving to malicious binaries references expressvpn security team 2021 november 16 cybersecurity lessons a path vulnerability in windows retrieved september 28 2023 nischay hegde and siddartha malladi 2023 july 12 poc exploit fake proof of concept with backdoor malware retrieved september 28 2023 vivek gite 2023 august 22 macos set change path variable command retrieved september 28 2023 elastic security 7 17 2022 february 1 modification of environment variable via launchctl retrieved september 28 2023 dhs cisa 2026 february 11 ar25 338a brickstorm backdoor retrieved april 16 2026 adi zeligson rotem kerner 2018 november 13 enter the darkgate new cryptocurrency mining and ransomware campaign retrieved february 9 2024 schroeder w warner j nelson m n d github powershellempire retrieved april 28 2016 powershellmafia 2012 may 26 powersploit a powershell post exploitation framework retrieved february 6 2018 powersploit n d powersploit retrieved february 6 2018 microsoft n d createprocess function retrieved september 12 2024 microsoft n d dynamic link library security retrieved july 25 2016 kanthak s 2016 july 20 vulnerability and exploit detector retrieved february 3 2017 beechey j 2014 november 18 application whitelisting panacea or propaganda retrieved november 18 2014 gorzelany a hall j poggemeyer l 2019 january 7 windows defender application control retrieved july 16 2019 tomonaga s 2016 january 26 windows commands abused by attackers retrieved february 2 2016 nsa information assurance directorate 2014 august application whitelisting using microsoft applocker retrieved march 31 2016 corio c sayana d p 2008 june application lockdown with software restriction policies retrieved november 18 2014 microsoft 2012 june 27 using software restriction policies and applocker policies retrieved april 7 2016 core objects all core att ck objects all none matrices tactics techniques sub techniques defenses all defenses all none mitigations assets detection strategies analytics data components cti all cti all none groups software campaigns reference all reference all none resources domains all domains all none enterprise mobile ics reset filters contact us terms of use privacy policy website changelog cookie preferences 2015 2026 the mitre corporation mitre att ck and att ck are registered trademarks of the mitre corporation