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acquire access technique t1650 enterprise mitre att ck matrices enterprise mobile ics tactics enterprise mobile ics techniques enterprise mobile ics defenses mitigations enterprise mobile ics assets detections detection strategies analytics data components cti groups software campaigns resources get started learn more about att ck att ck advisory council att ckcon att ck data tools faq engage with att ck version history updates legal branding benefactors contribute blog search att ckcon 7 0 in person tickets are open join us october 27 28 2026 in mclean va register here for in person tickets hotel and location details can be found in the faq home techniques enterprise acquire access acquire access adversaries may purchase or otherwise acquire an existing access to a target system or network a variety of online services and initial access broker networks are available to sell access to previously compromised systems 1 2 3 in some cases adversary groups may form partnerships to share compromised systems with each other 4 footholds to compromised systems may take a variety of forms such as access to planted backdoors e g web shell or established access via external remote services in some cases access brokers will implant compromised systems with a load that can be used to install additional malware for paying customers 1 by leveraging existing access broker networks rather than developing or obtaining their own initial access capabilities an adversary can potentially reduce the resources required to gain a foothold on a target network and focus their efforts on later stages of compromise adversaries may prioritize acquiring access to systems that have been determined to lack security monitoring or that have high privileges or systems that belong to organizations in a particular sector 1 2 in some cases purchasing access to an organization in sectors such as it contracting software development or telecommunications may allow an adversary to compromise additional victims via a trusted relationship multi factor authentication interception or even supply chain compromise note while this technique is distinct from other behaviors such as purchase technical data and credentials they may often be used in conjunction especially where the acquired foothold requires valid accounts id t1650 sub techniques no sub techniques ⓘ tactic resource development ⓘ platforms pre contributors jeffrey barto jeremy kennelly version 1 0 created 10 march 2023 last modified 24 october 2025 version permalink live version procedure examples id name description g1051 medusa group medusa group has purchased user credentials and other sensitive data from initial access brokers iabs 5 6 7 8 mitigations id mitigation description m1056 pre compromise this technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls detection strategy id name analytic id analytic description det0884 detection of acquire access an2016 much of this takes place outside the visibility of the target organization making detection difficult for defenders detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle such as during initial access references microsoft 2022 may 9 ransomware as a service understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself retrieved march 10 2023 crowdstrike intelligence team 2022 february 23 access brokers who are the targets and what are they worth retrieved march 10 2023 brian krebs 2012 october 22 service sells access to fortune 500 firms retrieved march 10 2023 cybersecurity infrastructure and defense agency 2022 june 2 karakurt data extortion group retrieved march 10 2023 anthony galiette doel santos 2024 january 11 medusa ransomware turning your files into stone retrieved october 15 2025 check point 2025 april 16 the 2025 ransomware surge context for medusa s rise retrieved october 15 2025 cybersecurity and infrastructure security agency 2025 march 12 aa25 071a stopransomware medusa ransomware retrieved october 15 2025 intel471 2025 may 14 threat hunting case study medusa ransomware retrieved october 15 2025 core objects all core att ck objects all none matrices tactics techniques sub techniques defenses all defenses all none mitigations assets detection strategies analytics data components cti all cti all none groups software campaigns reference all reference all none resources domains all domains all none enterprise mobile ics reset filters contact us terms of use privacy policy website changelog cookie preferences 2015 2026 the mitre corporation mitre att ck and att ck are registered trademarks of the mitre corporation