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exclusive control technique t1668 enterprise mitre att ck matrices enterprise mobile ics tactics enterprise mobile ics techniques enterprise mobile ics defenses mitigations enterprise mobile ics assets detections detection strategies analytics data components cti groups software campaigns resources get started learn more about att ck att ck advisory council att ckcon att ck data tools faq engage with att ck version history updates legal branding benefactors contribute blog search att ckcon 7 0 in person tickets are open join us october 27 28 2026 in mclean va register here for in person tickets hotel and location details can be found in the faq home techniques enterprise exclusive control exclusive control adversaries who successfully compromise a system may attempt to maintain persistence by closing the door behind them in other words by preventing other threat actors from initially accessing or maintaining a foothold on the same system for example adversaries may patch a vulnerable compromised system 1 2 to prevent other threat actors from leveraging that vulnerability in the future they may close the door in other ways such as disabling vulnerable services 3 stripping privileges from accounts 4 or removing other malware already on the compromised device 5 hindering other threat actors may allow an adversary to maintain sole access to a compromised system or network this prevents the threat actor from needing to compete with or even being removed themselves by other threat actors it also reduces the noise in the environment lowering the possibility of being caught and evicted by defenders finally in the case of resource hijacking leveraging a compromised device s full power allows the threat actor to maximize profit 3 id t1668 sub techniques no sub techniques ⓘ tactic persistence ⓘ platforms linux windows macos contributors menachem goldstein version 1 0 created 31 january 2025 last modified 15 april 2025 version permalink live version mitigations this type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features detection strategy id name analytic id analytic description det0015 detection strategy for exclusive control an0045 detects unusual command executions and service modifications that indicate self patching or disabling of vulnerable services post compromise defenders should monitor for service stop commands suspicious process termination and execution of binaries or scripts aligned with known patching or service management tools outside of expected admin contexts an0046 detects adversary attempts to monopolize control of compromised systems by issuing service stop commands unloading vulnerable modules or forcefully killing competing processes defenders should monitor audit logs and syslog for administrative utilities systemctl service kill being invoked outside of normal change management an0047 detects unauthorized termination of system daemons or commands issued through launchctl or kill to stop competing services or malware processes defenders should monitor unified logs and edr telemetry for unusual service modifications or terminations references michael raggi adam aprahamian dan kelly mathew potaczek marcin siedlarz austin larsen 2024 march 21 bringing access back initial access brokers exploit f5 big ip cve 2023 46747 and screenconnect retrieved january 31 2025 cert austria 2025 march 20 ransomware gruppen nutzen weiterhin kritische fortinet schwachstellen warnung vor gepatchten aber bereits kompromittierten geräten retrieved march 31 2025 matt wixey 2022 august 9 multiple attackers increase pressure on victims complicate incident response retrieved january 31 2025 assaf morag 2024 august 19 pg_mem a malware hidden in the postgres processes retrieved january 31 2025 f secure 2004 worm w32 netsky h retrieved january 31 2025 core objects all core att ck objects all none matrices tactics techniques sub techniques defenses all defenses all none mitigations assets detection strategies analytics data components cti all cti all none groups software campaigns reference all reference all none resources domains all domains all none enterprise mobile ics reset filters contact us terms of use privacy policy website changelog cookie preferences 2015 2026 the mitre corporation mitre att ck and att ck are registered trademarks of the mitre corporation