Meta tags:

Headings (most frequently used words):

view, source, for, deterrence, theory,

Text of the page (most frequently used words):
the (89), and (40), that (39), #deterrence (34), ref (28), state (28), are (21), defending (21), military (20), you (20), for (18), states (18), #theory (16), have (16), attacking (15), not (13), about (12), journal (12), date (11), pages (11), name (11), deter (11), rational (10), interests (10), tripwires (10), title (9), more (9), force (9), cite (8), other (8), resolve (8), can (8), view (7), from (7), https (7), doi (7), forces (7), schelling (7), url (7), this (7), wikipedia (6), org (6), use (6), game (6), volume (6), reputations (6), potential (6), aggression (6), last1 (5), first1 (5), issue (5), s2cid (5), issn (5), actors (5), huth (5), argued (5), threat (5), conflict (5), bargaining (5), power (5), stake (5), international (5), first (5), article (5), web (5), will (5), specific (5), main (5), 2021 (5), deployments (5), blocked (5), edit (5), source (4), search (4), approach (4), has (4), last2 (4), first2 (4), 2307 (4), jstor (4), likely (4), strategy (4), only (4), chapter (4), behavior (4), when (4), who (4), archive (4), cliff (4), him (4), either (4), such (4), been (4), information (4), well (4), security (4), small (4), tripwire (4), dan (4), page (4), add (3), one (3), case (3), studies (3), world (3), politics (3), 0043 (3), 8871 (3), paul (3), what (3), work (3), strategic (3), cost (3), outcomes (3), deterrent (3), credible (3), huth_1999 (3), both (3), capabilities (3), armed (3), resolved (3), signaling (3), last (3), another (3), successful (3), www (3), content (3), 2005 (3), your (3), off (3), would (3), leaders (3), attack (3), range (3), actions (3), all (3), with (3), credibility (3), certain (3), arguments (3), argument (3), past (3), behaviour (3), argues (3), inferences (3), believe (3), even (3), status (3), truth (3), why (3), access (3), wrong (3), 2022 (3), block (3), globally (3), address (3), read (3), hide (3), move (3), sidebar (3), tools (3), languages (2), contact (2), wiki (2), choice (2), decision (2), see (2), 2010405 (2), russett (2), bruce (2), makes (2), 2010184 (2), unitary (2), assumption (2), dyads (2), interactions (2), between (2), benefit (2), calculations (2), 2010511 (2), theorists (2), success (2), costs (2), its (2), under (2), balance (2), 1966 (2), now (2), schelling_1966 (2), since (2), breakdown (2), citation (2), year (2), violence (2), publisher (2), university (2), press (2), capacity (2), avoid (2), most (2), nobel (2), prize (2), washingtonpost (2), com (2), dyn (2), ar2005101101336 (2), html (2), washington (2), post (2), edge (2), get (2), how (2), closer (2), way (2), convince (2), risk (2), than (2), often (2), they (2), seek (2), disputed (2), territory (2), limited (2), adversary (2), short (2), term (2), ability (2), action (2), problem (2), communicate (2), determined (2), may (2), statements (2), costly (2), signals (2), those (2), increase (2), which (2), strong (2), beliefs (2), expected (2), future (2), conflicts (2), impact (2), general (2), because (2), draw (2), third (2), example (2), perception (2), 2538549 (2), established (2), greater (2), quo (2), using (2), deployment (2), tnsr (2), review (2), reiter (2), untied (2), hands (2), editor (2), cambridge (2), altman (2), 1080 (2), 09636412 (2), 0963 (2), 6412 (2), study (2), brian (2), blankenship (2), erik (2), lin (2), greenberg (2), high (2), low (2), capability (2), were (2), reassuring (2), hdl (2), blocks (2), editing (2), recent (2), abuse (2), affect (2), done (2), links (2), help (2), current (2), 135 (2), following (2), reason (2), appearance (2), upload (2), file (2), changes (2), history (2), log (2), create (2), account (2), donate (2), menu (2), topic, mobile, cookie, statement, statistics, developers, code, conduct, legal, safety, contacts, disclaimers, privacy, policy, retrieved, deterrence_theory, return, theorizing, entailed, theoretic, models, making, entails, achen, christopher, snidal, duncan, 1989, comparative, 143, 169, 153591618, rationality, 1984, cases, 1900, 1980, 496, 526, 153596965, actor, understood, tend, triads, consider, choices, reflect, 1990, testing, rigor, difference, 466, 501, 154490426, consistently, outlines, considered, possesses, inflict, substantial, believes, available, goes, explain, four, key, factors, consideration, american, economist, thomas, brought, his, background, subject, studying, classic, presents, concept, longer, defined, science, victory, instead, was, equally, art, coercion, intimidation, consequence, nuclear, catastrophic, human, civilisation, reasonable, employ, chance, zero, diplomacy, place, new, haven, yale, says, harm, used, motivating, factor, influence, coercive, must, anticipated, avoidable, accommodation, therefore, summarized, hurt, foundation, held, reserve, celebrating, memorial, economics, laureate, got, webarchive, 20190925233204, http, 2019, october, michael, kinsley, columnist, former, students, anecdotally, summarizes, reorientation, thus, standing, chained, ankle, someone, else, released, large, soon, gives, persuade, guy, give, method, disposal, threatening, push, doom, answer, start, dancing, don, something, totally, irrational, plunge, yourself, just, prepared, take, higher, accidentally, falling, win, directed, against, territorial, goals, attain, seizing, occupying, after, decisive, defeat, orientation, generally, driven, concerns, effectiveness, need, respond, quickly, strongly, contingencies, fails, underestimates, overestimates, undertake, particular, course, needed, february, 2026, central, seeks, diplomatic, incentive, act, resist, hope, back, away, seemingly, incentives, discount, made, along, any, movement, merely, bluffs, regard, required, clearly, also, backing, down, bluff, unwilling, cross, threshold, fear, committing, themselves, relations, there, three, different, developed, relation, role, influencing, focuses, disputes, crises, creates, credibilities, policies, arguably, linked, over, time, powerful, causal, whether, challenge, immediate, second, heavily, configuration, political, constraints, faced, given, situation, attempted, school, thought, prior, reliable, predictor, middle, ground, two, approaches, reputational, conditions, insight, expectation, decisionmakers, types, drawing, updates, revises, unanticipated, cannot, explained, variables, shows, extends, parties, adversaries, underlies, attempts, fail, backfire, assumptions, others, perceptions, incorrect, 1982, jervis, robert, although, known, look, beyond, tactics, determine, justify, risks, dispute, willing, endure, losses, secure, less, salient, economic, furthermore, supporters, critics, agree, unfavorable, assessment, domestic, undermine, severely, test, utility, reduced, declining, position, failure, alternative, option, becomes, relatively, attractive, entail, deployed, abroad, them, trigger, live, 20210602145321, website, texas, national, language, poast, book, 2025, wars, 174, 199, core, books, 8242f5bc12be57d81e9993ebda97f16d, 1017, 9781009596060, 007, isbn, 978, 009, 59608, subscription, citing, western, berlin, 1948, 1949, soviet, 2018, advancing, without, around, 2017, 1360074, 148987375, found, viewed, allies, alternatives, stationed, offshore, their, cast, doubt, value, trivial, alliance, reassurance, 117, 2038662, 247040733, 1721, 148673, free, copy, some, kinds, restrict, service, providers, telecom, companies, response, vandalism, sometimes, users, unrelated, below, assistance, anything, useful, global, mistake, find, additional, instructions, stewards, wizard, while, still, able, meta, usually, expire, january, 2027, 194, visit, affected, faq, open, proxy, webhost, jon, kolbert, affects, wikimedia, wikis, people, message, nothing, does, permission, wikidata, item, projects, switch, legacy, parser, shortened, related, here, english, talk, personal, special, community, portal, learn, contribute, random, events, contents, navigation, jump,

Text of the page (random words):
view source for deterrence theory wikipedia jump to content main menu main menu move to sidebar hide navigation main page contents current events random article about wikipedia contact us contribute help learn to edit community portal recent changes upload file special pages search search appearance donate create account log in personal tools donate create account log in view source for deterrence theory add languages article talk english read edit view history tools tools move to sidebar hide actions read edit view history general what links here related changes upload file page information get shortened url switch to legacy parser in other projects wikidata item appearance move to sidebar hide deterrence theory you do not have permission to edit this page for the following reason this ip address range has been globally blocked this does not affect your ability to read wikipedia pages most people who see this message have done nothing wrong some kinds of blocks restrict editing from specific service providers or telecom companies in response to recent abuse or vandalism and can sometimes affect other users who are unrelated to that abuse review the information below for assistance if you do not believe that you have done anything wrong this block affects editing on all wikimedia wikis the ip address or range 5 135 0 0 16 has been globally blocked by jon kolbert for the following reason s open proxy webhost visit the faq if you are affected this block will expire on 04 29 8 january 2027 your current ip address is 5 135 42 194 even while globally blocked you will usually still be able to edit pages on meta wiki if you believe you were blocked by mistake you can find additional information and instructions in the stewards block wizard other useful links global blocks help i have been blocked you can view and copy the source of this page rational deterrence theory one approach to theorizing about deterrence has entailed the use of rational choice and game theoretic models of decision making see game theory rational deterrence theory entails ref cite journal last1 achen first1 christopher h last2 snidal first2 duncan date 1989 title rational deterrence theory and comparative case studies journal world politics volume 41 issue 2 pages 143 169 doi 10 2307 2010405 jstor 2010405 s2cid 153591618 issn 0043 8871 ref rationality actors are rational ref name deter cite journal last1 huth first1 paul last2 russett first2 bruce date 1984 title what makes deterrence work cases from 1900 to 1980 journal world politics volume 36 issue 4 pages 496 526 doi 10 2307 2010184 jstor 2010184 s2cid 153596965 issn 0043 8871 ref unitary actor assumption actors are understood as unitary ref name deter dyads interactions tend to be between dyads or triads of states strategic interactions actors consider the choices of other actors ref name deter cost benefit calculations outcomes reflect actors cost benefit calculations ref name deter ref cite journal last1 huth first1 paul last2 russett first2 bruce date 1990 title testing deterrence theory rigor makes a difference journal world politics volume 42 issue 4 pages 466 501 doi 10 2307 2010511 jstor 2010511 s2cid 154490426 issn 0043 8871 ref deterrence theorists have consistently argued that deterrence success is more likely if a defending state s deterrent threat is credible to an attacking state huth ref name huth_1999 outlines that a threat is considered credible if the defending state possesses both the military capabilities to inflict substantial costs on an attacking state in an armed conflict and the attacking state believes that the defending state is resolved to use its available military forces huth ref name huth_1999 goes on to explain the four key factors for consideration under rational deterrence theory the military balance signaling and bargaining power reputations for resolve interests at stake the american economist thomas schelling brought his background in game theory to the subject of studying international deterrence schelling s 1966 classic work on deterrence presents the concept that military strategy can no longer be defined as the science of military victory instead it is argued that military strategy was now equally if not more the art of coercion intimidation and deterrence ref name schelling_1966 since the consequence of a breakdown of the nuclear deterrence strategy is so catastrophic for human civilisation it is reasonable to employ the strategy only if the chance of breakdown is zero citation last schelling first t c year 1966 title the diplomacy of violence place new haven publisher yale university press chapter 2 pages 1 34 ref schelling says the capacity to harm another state is now used as a motivating factor for other states to avoid it and influence another state s behavior to be coercive or deter another state violence must be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation it can therefore be summarized that the use of the power to hurt as bargaining power is the foundation of deterrence theory and is most successful when it is held in reserve ref name schelling_1966 in an article celebrating schelling s nobel memorial prize for economics ref https www washingtonpost com wp dyn content article 2005 10 11 ar2005101101336 html a nobel laureate who s got game webarchive url https web archive org web 20190925233204 http www washingtonpost com wp dyn content article 2005 10 11 ar2005101101336 html date 2019 09 25 the washington post october 12 2005 ref michael kinsley washington post op ed op ed columnist and one of schelling s former students anecdotally summarizes schelling s reorientation of game theory thus y ou re standing at the edge of a cliff chained by the ankle to someone else you ll be released and one of you will get a large prize as soon as the other gives in how do you persuade the other guy to give in when the only method at your disposal threatening to push him off the cliff would doom you both answer you start dancing closer and closer to the edge that way you don t have to convince him that you would do something totally irrational plunge him and yourself off the cliff you just have to convince him that you are prepared to take a higher risk than he is of accidentally falling off the cliff if you can do that you win military balance deterrence is often directed against state leaders who have specific territorial goals that they seek to attain either by seizing disputed territory in a limited military attack or by occupying disputed territory after the decisive defeat of the adversary s armed forces in either case the strategic orientation of potential attacking states generally is for the short term and is driven by concerns about military cost and effectiveness for successful deterrence defending states need the military capacity to respond quickly and strongly to a range of contingencies deterrence often fails if either a defending state or an attacking state underestimates or overestimates the other s ability to undertake a particular course of action citation needed date february 2026 signaling and bargaining power the central problem for a state that seeks to communicate a credible deterrent threat by diplomatic or military actions is that all defending states have an incentive to act as if they are determined to resist an attack in the hope that the attacking state will back away from military conflict with a seemingly resolved adversary if all defending states have such incentives potential attacking states may discount statements made by defending states along with any movement of military forces as merely bluffs in that regard rational deterrence theorists have argued that costly signals are required to communicate the credibility of a defending state s resolve those are actions and statements that clearly increase the risk of a military conflict and also increase the costs of backing down from a deterrent threat states that bluff are unwilling to cross a certain threshold of threat and military action for fear of committing themselves to an armed conflict reputations for resolve main credibility international relations there are three different arguments that have been developed in relation to the role of reputations in influencing deterrence outcomes the first argument focuses on a defending state s past behavior in international disputes and crises which creates strong beliefs in a potential attacking state about the defending state s expected behaviour in future conflicts the credibilities of a defending state s policies are arguably linked over time and reputations for resolve have a powerful causal impact on an attacking state s decision whether to challenge either general or immediate deterrence the second approach argues that reputations have a limited impact on deterrence outcomes because the credibility of deterrence is heavily determined by the specific configuration of military capabilities interests at stake and political constraints faced by a defending state in a given situation of attempted deterrence the argument of that school of thought is that potential attacking states are not likely to draw strong inferences about a defending states resolve from prior conflicts because potential attacking states do not believe that a defending state s past behaviour is a reliable predictor of future behavior the third approach is a middle ground between the first two approaches and argues that potential attacking states are likely to draw reputational inferences about resolve from the past behaviour of defending states only under certain conditions the insight is the expectation that decisionmakers use only certain types of information when drawing inferences about reputations and an attacking state updates and revises its beliefs when a defending state s unanticipated behavior cannot be explained by case specific variables an example shows that the problem extends to the perception of the third parties as well as main adversaries and underlies the way in which attempts at deterrence can fail and even backfire if the assumptions about the others perceptions are incorrect ref cite journal doi 10 2307 2538549 volume 7 issue 3 title deterrence and perception journal international security pages 3 30 year 1982 last1 jervis first1 robert jstor 2538549 ref interests at stake although costly signaling and bargaining power are more well established arguments in rational deterrence theory the interests of defending states are not as well known attacking states may look beyond the short term bargaining tactics of a defending state and seek to determine what interests are at stake for the defending state that would justify the risks of a military conflict the argument is that defending states that have greater interests at stake in a dispute are more resolved to use force and more willing to endure military losses to secure those interests even less well established arguments are the specific interests that are more salient to state leaders such as military interests and economic interests furthermore huth ref name huth_1999 argues that both supporters and critics of rational deterrence theory agree that an unfavorable assessment of the domestic and international status quo by state leaders can undermine or severely test the success of deterrence in a rational choice approach if the expected utility of not using force is reduced by a declining status quo position deterrence failure is more likely since the alternative option of using force becomes relatively more attractive tripwires tripwires entail that small forces are deployed abroad with the assumption that an attack on them will trigger a greater deployment of forces ref name tripwire cite web date 2021 06 02 title the truth about tripwires why small force deployments do not deter aggression url https tnsr org 2021 06 the truth about tripwires why small force deployments do not deter aggression url status live archive url https web archive org web 20210602145321 https tnsr org 2021 06 the truth about tripwires why small force deployments do not deter aggression archive date 2021 06 02 access date 2021 06 03 website texas national security review language en us ref dan reiter and paul poast have argued that tripwires do not deter aggression ref name tripwire ref cite book chapter tripwire force deployments date 2025 title untied hands how states avoid the wrong wars pages 174 199 editor last reiter editor first dan chapter url https www cambridge org core books untied hands tripwire force deployments 8242f5bc12be57d81e9993ebda97f16d publisher cambridge university press doi 10 1017 9781009596060 007 isbn 978 1 009 59608 4 chapter url access subscription ref dan altman has argued that tripwires do work to deter aggression citing the western deployment of forces to berlin in 1948 1949 to deter soviet aggression as a successful example ref cite journal last altman first dan date 2018 title advancing without attacking the strategic game around the use of force journal security studies volume 27 issue 1 pages 58 88 doi 10 1080 09636412 2017 1360074 issn 0963 6412 s2cid 148987375 ref a 2022 study by brian blankenship and erik lin greenberg found that high resolve low capability signals such as tripwires were not viewed as more reassuring to allies than low resolve high capability alternatives such as forces stationed offshore their study cast doubt on the reassuring value of tripwires ref cite journal last1 blankenship first1 brian last2 lin greenberg first2 erik date 2022 title trivial tripwires military capabilities and alliance reassurance journal security studies volume 31 pages 92 117 doi 10 1080 09636412 2022 2038662 s2cid 247040733 issn 0963 6412 hdl 1721 1 148673 hdl access free ref return to deterrence theory retrieved from https en wikipedia org wiki deterrence_theory privacy policy about wikipedia disclaimers contact wikipedia legal safety contacts code of conduct developers statistics cookie statement mobile view search search view source for deterrence theory add languages add topic