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t and georg henrik von wright in anscombe s oxford flat 4 feyerabend argued that frameworks of thought and thus scientific paradigms can be incommensurable for three reasons briefly put feyerabend s notion of incommensurability is as follows the interpretation of observations is implicitly influenced by theoretical assumptions it is therefore impossible to describe or evaluate observations independently of theory paradigms often have different assumptions about which intellectual and operational scientific methods result in valid scientific knowledge paradigms can be based on different assumptions regarding the structure of their domain which makes it impossible to compare them in a meaningful way the adoption of a new theory includes and is dependent upon the adoption of new terms thus scientists are using different terms when talking about different theories those who hold different competing theories to be true will be talking over one another in the sense that they cannot a priori arrive at agreement given two different discourses with two different theoretical language and dictates according to feyerabend the idea of incommensurability cannot be captured in formal logic because it is a phenomenon outside of logic s domain theories edit in 1989 feyerabend presented an idea informed by popper s critical rationalism whereby investigation starts with a problem the problem is the result of a conflict between an expectation and an observation which in its turn is formed by the expectation feyerabend 1989 pp 96 scientific methodology then resolves problems by inventing theories that should be relevant and falsifiable at least to a greater degree than any other alternative solution once an alternative theory is presented the critical phase commences regarding t which must answer the following questions a why has theory t been successful up until now and b why has it failed if the new theory t answers both questions then t is discarded that is a new theory t in order to be an adequate successor to the refuted theory t must have a collection of additional predictions regarding t class a as well as a collection of successful predictions that coincide to a certain degree with the old theory class s these class s predictions constitute those parts of the new theory containing new truths and they therefore exclude a series of consequences of t the failures in the old theory which are part of the untrue false contents of the new theory class f given this model it is possible to construct relational statements between certain terms from t and from t which will be the basis for the comparison between the theories this will allow a choice between the two in the light of their empirical contents but if we come across a theory t in which class s is empty then the theories are incommensurable with each other however feyerabend clarifies this by stating that incommensurability between t and t will depend on the interpretation given to the theories if this is instrumental every theory that refers to the same language of observation will be commensurable in the same way if a realist perspective is sought then it will favour a unified position which employs the most highly abstracted terms of whatever theory is being considered in order to describe both theories giving a significance to the observational statements as a function of these terms or at least to replace the habitual use they are given it can be noted that the instrumentalist interpretation recognizes the existence of certain statements whose truth is not only dependent on the observational statements but also on the evaluation criteria they are subjected to which are anchored in the theories for example to affirm the relational character of longitude this asseveration can not be decided solely using observational terms its truth value in part depends on the theory that establishes the sense in which the terms are used in this case they relate to quantum mechanics qm as opposed to classical mechanics cm in this sense the instrumentalist position only deals with the empirical consequences and leaves to one side the relationship that the concepts have with each other in this same way feyerabend comments that 5 it is certain of course that the relativist scheme has very often given us numbers that are practically identical to the numbers obtained from cm but this does not mean that the concepts are very similar for even if yielding strictly identical predictions can be used as an argument to show that the concepts must match at least in this case different magnitudes based on different concepts can give identical values for their respective scales while being different magnitudes so it is not possible to make a comparison of the contents nor is it possible to make a judgement regarding its verisimilitude paul feyerabend realist objections edit in relation to realist objections feyerabend returns to an argument elaborated by carnap and comments that the use of such abstract concepts leads to an impossible position as theoretical terms receive their interpretation by being connected with an observational language and those terms are empty without that connection feyerabend pp 373 as before it follows that they can not be used to confer significance to the observational language as this observational language is its only source of significance with which it is not possible to make a translation but only a restatement of the term therefore feyerabend considers that both the instrumentalist and the realist interpretations are flawed as they try to defend the idea that incommensurability is a legitimately unsolvable idea with which to revoke the theses of the accumulation of knowledge and panrationalism in science this leads to the following consideration if each new theory has its own observational basis within the meaning of the theoretical framework how can we hope that the observations that are produced could eventually refute it furthermore how can we actually recognize that the new position explains what it is supposed to explain or if it is deviating off into other areas and therefore how can the theories be definitively compared feyerabend s answer to the first consideration lies in noting that the initial terms of a theory depend on the postulates of the theory and their associated grammatical rules in addition the predictions derived from the theory also depend on the underlying conditions of the system feyerabend doesn t explore the point further but it can be assumed that if the prediction does not agree with the observation and if we have a high degree of confidence in the description that we have made from the initial conditions than we can be sure that the error must be present in our theory and in its underlying terms in dealing with the second consideration feyerabend asks why should it be necessary to have a terminology that allows us to say that two theories refer to the same experiment this supposes a unificationist or possibly a realist aspiration whose objective appears to be the truth however it is assumed that the theory can be compared under a criterion of empirical adequacy such an approach would build on the relationship established between the observational statement that describes the outcome of an experiment formulated for each theory independently which is compared with the predictions that each theory posits in this way the selection is made when a theory is an empirically better fit if the objection to the possible deviation of the new theory is not answered it is irrelevant as often history has shown that in fact differing points of view change or modify their fields of application for example the physics of aristotle and newton theory selection edit see also models of scientific inquiry choice of a theory the above implies that the process of choosing between theories does not obey a universal rationality feyerabend has the following view regarding whether the absence of a universal rationality constitutes an irrational position 6 no because each particular episode is rational in the sense that some of its features can be explained in terms of reasons which were either accepted at the time of its occurrence or invented in the course of its development yes because even these local reasons which change from age to age are never sufficient to explain all the important features of a particular episode paul feyerabend feyerabend uses this reasoning to try to shed light on one of popper s arguments which says that we are always able to change any statement even those reference systems that guide our critical thinking however the two thinkers reach different conclusions popper assumes that it is always possible to make a criticism once the new criteria have been accepted so the selection can be seen as the result of a rationality a posteriori to the selection while feyerabend s position is that this solution is merely a verbal ornament whenever the standards are influenced by popper s first world the physical world and they are not just developed in the third world that is the standards are influenced by the expectations of their originators the stances they imply and the ways of interpreting the world they favour but this is strictly analogous to the same process of the scientific revolution that leads us to believe that the thesis of incommensurability can also be applied to standards as is shown by the following asseveration 7 even the most puritanical rationalist will then be forced to stop reasoning and to use propaganda and coercion not because some of his reasons have ceased to be valid but because the psychological conditions which make them effective and capable of influencing others have disappeared and what is the use of an argument that leaves people unmoved paul feyerabend feyerabend states that the popperian criticism is either related to certain clearly defined procedures or is totally abstract and leaves others with the task of fleshing it out later with specific contents making popper s rationality a mere verbal ornament this does not imply that feyerabend is an irrationalist but that he considers that the process of scientific change can not be explained in its totality in the light of some rationality precisely because of incommensurability kuhn s perspectives edit the second coauthor of the thesis of incommensurability is thomas kuhn who introduced it in his 1962 book the structure of scientific revolutions in which he describes it as a universal property that defines the relationship between successive paradigms under this meaning incommensurability goes beyond the field of semantics and covers everything relating to its practical application from the study of problems to the associated methods and rules for their resolution however the meaning of the term was continually refined throughout kuhn s work he first placed it within the field of semantics and applied a narrow definition but later he redefined it in a taxonomic sense wherein changes are found in the relationships between similarities and differences that the subjects of a defining matrix draw over the world in the structure of scientific revolutions kuhn wrote that the historian of science may be tempted to exclaim that when paradigms change the world itself changes with them 8 111 according to kuhn the proponents of different scientific paradigms cannot fully appreciate or understand the other s point of view because they are as a way of speaking living in different worlds kuhn gave three reasons for this inability proponents of competing paradigms have different ideas about the importance of solving various scientific problems and about the standards that a solution should satisfy the vocabulary and problem solving methods that the paradigms use can be different the proponents of competing paradigms utilize a different conceptual network the proponents of different paradigms see the world in a different way because of their scientific training and prior experience in research in a postscript 1969 to the structure of scientific revolutions kuhn added that he thought that incommensurability was at least in part a consequence of the role of similarity sets in normal science competing paradigms group concepts in different ways with different similarity relations according to kuhn this causes fundamental problems in communication between proponents of different paradigms it is difficult to change such categories in one s mind because the groups have been learned by means of exemplars instead of definitions this problem cannot be resolved by using a neutral language for communication according to kuhn since the difference occurs prior to the application of language kuhn s thinking on incommensurability was probably in some part influenced by his reading of michael polanyi who held that there can be a logical gap between belief systems and who also said that scientists from different schools think differently speak a different language live in a different world 9 phases edit given his changing definition of incommensurability pérez ransanz has identified three phases in kuhn s work or at least in how it deals with this concept as we have seen above the first phase was seen in the structure of scientific revolutions and it is characterized by an overall vision that is applied to paradigms this perspective was replaced in the 1970s by a localist and semanticist vision in which incommensurability is now defined as the relationship between two theories that are articulated in two languages that are not completely interchangeable as kuhn states in the following extract 10 the phrase without common measure is converted into without common language to state that two theories are incommensurable means that there is no neutral language or other type of language into which both theories conceived as sets of statements can be translated without remainder or loss although the majority of the terms shared by the two theories function in the same way in both thomas kuhn the above only prohibits one type of comparison that which is carried out between the statements of these two theories in a one to one relationship an idea that underlies this formulation is that translation implies symmetry and transitivity so that if theory t is translatable with theory t then t can be translated to t and furthermore if there is a third theory t and this can be translated to t then theories t and t cannot be incommensurable as long as the transitive relationship and the symmetrical relationship assures that their statements can be compared one to another kuhn did not deny that two incommensurable theories may have a common reference environment and in this sense he did not state that it was impossible to compare them his thesis solely refers to the ability to translate the statements belonging to two theories in a one to one relationship as is shown in the following passage 10 the terms that retain thei...
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