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epistemic closure wikipedia jump to content main menu main menu move to sidebar hide navigation main page contents current events random article about wikipedia contact us contribute help learn to edit community portal recent changes upload file special pages search search appearance donate create account log in personal tools donate create account log in contents move to sidebar hide top 1 epistemic closure and skeptical arguments 2 justificatory closure 3 in other uses toggle in other uses subsection 3 1 epistemic closure in u s political discussion 4 see also 5 references 6 external links toggle the table of contents epistemic closure 4 languages فارسی français italiano 日本語 edit links article talk english read edit view history tools tools move to sidebar hide actions read edit view history general what links here related changes upload file permanent link page information cite this page get shortened url switch to legacy parser print export download as pdf printable version in other projects wikidata item appearance move to sidebar hide from wikipedia the free encyclopedia principle in epistemology not to be confused with cognitive closure philosophy epistemic closure 1 is a property of some belief systems and of many epistemic modal logics viz those which are normal it is the principle that if a subject s displaystyle s knows proposition p displaystyle p and s displaystyle s knows that p displaystyle p implies q displaystyle q then s displaystyle s can thereby come to know q displaystyle q many epistemological theories involve a closure principle and many skeptical arguments assume a closure principle on the other hand some epistemologists including robert nozick have denied closure principles on the basis of reliabilist accounts of knowledge nozick suggested a truth tracking theory of knowledge according to which one knows p displaystyle p only if one s belief in p displaystyle p is sensitive 2 to the truth or falsehood of p displaystyle p in the relevant possibilities modal scenarios 2 specifically sensitivity to a proposition amounts to meeting two counterfactual conditions 1 if p displaystyle p were false then one would not believe p displaystyle p and 2 if p displaystyle p were true then one would believe p displaystyle p if knowledge must conform to the conditions for sensitivity then epistemic closure fails because one can know p and that p implies q whilst not being sensitive to the truth of q and therefore not knowing q a subject may not actually believe q for example regardless of whether he or she is justified or warranted thus one might instead say that knowledge is closed under known deduction if while knowing p s believes q because s knows that p entails q then s knows q 1 an even stronger formulation would be as such if while knowing various propositions s believes p because s knows that these propositions entail p then s knows p 1 while the principle of epistemic closure is generally regarded as intuitive 3 philosophers such as robert nozick and fred dretske have argued against it 4 epistemic closure and skeptical arguments edit the epistemic closure principle typically takes the form of a modus ponens argument s knows p s knows that p implies q therefore s knows q this epistemic closure principle is central to many versions of skeptical arguments a skeptical argument of this type will involve knowledge of some piece of widely accepted information to be knowledge which will then be pointed out to entail knowledge of some skeptical scenario such as the brain in a vat scenario or the cartesian evil demon scenario a skeptic might say for example that if you know that you have hands then you know that you are not a handless brain in a vat because knowledge that you have hands implies that you know you are not handless and if you know that you are not handless then you know that you are not a handless brain in a vat 5 the skeptic will then utilize this conditional to form a modus tollens argument for example the skeptic might make an argument like the following you do not know that you are not a handless brain in a vat k h displaystyle neg k neg h if you know that you have hands then you know that you are not a handless brain in a vat k o k h displaystyle ko to k neg h conclusion therefore you do not know that you have hands k o displaystyle neg ko much of the epistemological discussion surrounding this type of skeptical argument involves whether to accept or deny the conclusion and how to do each ernest sosa says that there are three possibilities in responding to the skeptic agree with the skeptic by granting him both premises and the conclusion 1 2 c disagree with the skeptic by denying premise 2 and the conclusion but maintaining premise 1 1 2 c as nozick and dretske do this amounts to denying the epistemic closure principle disagree with the skeptic by denying premise 1 and the conclusion but maintaining premise 2 1 2 c as moore does this amounts to maintaining the epistemic closure principle and holding that knowledge is closed under known implication justificatory closure edit in the seminal 1963 paper is justified true belief knowledge edmund gettier gave an assumption later called the principle of deducibility for justification by irving thalberg jr 6 that would serve as a basis for the rest of his piece for any proposition p if s is justified in believing p and p entails q and s deduces q from p and accepts q as a result of this deduction then s is justified in believing q 7 this was seized upon by thalberg who rejected the principle in order to demonstrate that one of gettier s examples fails to support gettier s main thesis that justified true belief is not knowledge in the following quotation 1 refers to jones will get the job 2 refers to jones has ten coins and 3 is the logical conjunction of 1 and 2 why doesn t gettier s principle pdj hold in the evidential situation he has described you multiply your risks of being wrong when you believe a conjunction t he most elementary theory of probability indicates that smith s prospects of being right on both 1 and 2 namely of being right on 3 are bound to be less favorable than his prospects of being right on either 1 or 2 in fact smith s chances of being right on 3 might not come up to the minimum standard of justification which 1 and 2 barely satisfy and smith would be unjustified in accepting 3 thalberg 1969 p 798 in other uses edit epistemic closure in u s political discussion edit the term epistemic closure has been used in an unrelated sense in american political debate to refer to the claim that political belief systems can be closed systems of deduction unaffected by empirical evidence 8 this use of the term was popularized by libertarian blogger and commentator julian sanchez in 2010 as an extreme form of confirmation bias 8 9 see also edit epistemic logic doxastic logic here is one hand objections and replies epistemological argument by george edward moore references edit 1 2 3 luper steven 31 december 2001 epistemic closure the epistemic closure principle stanford encyclopedia of philosophy metaphysics research lab stanford university 1 2 nozick robert 1981 philosophical explanations cambridge massachusetts belknap press of the harvard university press pp 172 177 isbn 978 0 674 66479 1 brady michael pritchard duncan 2005 epistemological contextualism problems and prospects the philosophical quarterly 55 219 161 171 doi 10 1111 j 0031 8094 2005 00393 x epistemic closure stanford encyclopedia of philosophy sosa ernest 1999 10 01 how to defeat opposition to moore noûs 33 141 153 doi 10 1111 0029 4624 33 s13 7 issn 1468 0068 thalberg jr irving november 1969 in defense of justified true belief journal of philosophy 66 22 794 803 doi 10 2307 2024370 jstor 2024370 gettier edmund june 1963 is justified true belief knowledge pdf analysis 23 6 121 3 doi 10 1093 analys 23 6 121 jstor 3326922 1 2 patricia cohen 27 april 2010 epistemic closure those are fighting words the new york times retrieved 28 november 2012 sanchez julian 26 march 2010 frum cocktail parties and the threat of doubt external links edit zalta edward n ed the epistemic closure principle stanford encyclopedia of philosophy issn 1095 5054 oclc 429049174 epistemic closure at the indiana philosophy ontology project fieser james dowden bradley eds epistemic closure internet encyclopedia of philosophy issn 2161 0002 oclc 37741658 epistemic closure at philpapers v t e philosophical skepticism types local moral pseudoskepticism radical religious jewish skeptics scientific solipsism philosophers indian sanjaya belatthiputta jayarāśi bhaṭṭa ajñana charvaka pre socratic xenophanes xeniades atomist metrodorus of chios anaxarchus nausiphanes academic skeptics arcesilaus diocles of cnidus lacydes telecles and evander hegesinus carneades hagnon of tarsus metrodorus of stratonicea aristanax clitomachus charmadas aeschines of neapolis philo of larissa cicero gaius aurelius cotta dio of alexandria simon foucher pyrrhonists pyrrho of elis timon agrippa sextus empiricus aenesidemus favorinus william chillingworth richard popkin robert fogelin benson mates scholasticism nicholas of autrecourt renaissance montaigne pierre charron francisco sanches uriel da costa pierre bayle humean david hume gottlob ernst schulze william drummond peter unger concepts acatalepsy aporia cartesian doubt epoché suspension of judgment ignoramus et ignorabimus skeptical scenarios brain in a vat dream argument evil demon five minute hypothesis münchhausen trilemma problem of the criterion problem of induction regress argument simulation hypothesis wax argument responses cogito ergo sum here is one hand semantic externalism process reliabilism epistemic closure contextualism relativism literature barhaspatya sutras academica cicero outlines of pyrrhonism against the dogmatists against the mathematicians essays montaigne discourse on the method a treatise of human nature aenesidemus v t e epistemology epistemologists william alston thomas aquinas aristotle robert audi augustine a j ayer george berkeley berlin circle laurence bonjour gilles deleuze keith derose rené descartes john dewey fred dretske edmund gettier alvin goldman nelson goodman paul grice anil gupta susan haack david hume immanuel kant søren kierkegaard peter klein saul kripke hilary kornblith david lewis john locke g e moore john mcdowell robert nozick alvin plantinga plato duncan pritchard james pryor hilary putnam w v o quine thomas reid bertrand russell gilbert ryle wilfrid sellars susanna siegel ernest sosa p f strawson baruch spinoza timothy williamson ludwig wittgenstein nicholas wolterstorff vienna circle more theories coherentism constructivism contextualism empiricism evolutionary epistemology fallibilism feminist epistemology fideism foundationalism hauntology holism infinitism innatism naïve realism naturalized epistemology phenomenalism positivism rationalism reductionism reliabilism representational realism skepticism transcendental idealism concepts a priori knowledge a posteriori knowledge analysis analytic synthetic distinction belief certainty common sense descriptive knowledge exploratory thought epistemic injustice epistemic virtue gettier problem induction internalism and externalism justification knowledge meta objectivity privileged access problem of induction problem of other minds perception procedural knowledge proposition regress argument simplicity truth uncertainty worldview related articles faith and rationality formal epistemology metaepistemology philosophy of perception philosophy of science social epistemology virtue epistemology wikipedia category outline portal wikiproject stubs discussion retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title epistemic_closure oldid 1372520990 categories concepts in epistemology belief epistemic logic philosophy of robert nozick concepts in logic hidden categories articles with short description short description matches wikidata articles with internet encyclopedia of philosophy links this page was last edited on 1 september 2026 at 02 36 utc page was rendered with parsoid text is available under the creative commons attribution sharealike 4 0 license additional terms may apply by using this site you agree to the terms of use and privacy policy wikipedia is a registered trademark of the wikimedia foundation inc a non profit organization privacy policy about wikipedia disclaimers contact wikipedia legal safety contacts code of conduct developers statistics cookie statement mobile view search search toggle the table of contents epistemic closure 4 languages add topic