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keywords=WPA2, KRACK, key reinstallation, security protocols, network security, attacks, nonce reuse, handshake, packet number, initialization vector, Mathy Vanhoef;
description=This website presents the Key Reinstallation Attack (KRACK). It breaks the WPA2 protocol by forcing nonce reuse in encryption algorithms used by Wi-Fi.;

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Text of the page (random words):
android apps in android apps again in banking apps and even in vpn apps details our main attack is against the 4 way handshake of the wpa2 protocol this handshake is executed when a client wants to join a protected wi fi network and is used to confirm that both the client and access point possess the correct credentials e g the pre shared password of the network at the same time the 4 way handshake also negotiates a fresh encryption key that will be used to encrypt all subsequent traffic currently all modern protected wi fi networks use the 4 way handshake this implies all these networks are affected by some variant of our attack for instance the attack works against personal and enterprise wi fi networks against the older wpa and the latest wpa2 standard and even against networks that only use aes all our attacks against wpa2 use a novel technique called a key reinstallation attack krack key reinstallation attacks high level description in a key reinstallation attack the adversary tricks a victim into reinstalling an already in use key this is achieved by manipulating and replaying cryptographic handshake messages when the victim reinstalls the key associated parameters such as the incremental transmit packet number i e nonce and receive packet number i e replay counter are reset to their initial value essentially to guarantee security a key should only be installed and used once unfortunately we found this is not guaranteed by the wpa2 protocol by manipulating cryptographic handshakes we can abuse this weakness in practice key reinstallation attacks concrete example against the 4 way handshake as described in the introduction of the research paper the idea behind a key reinstallation attack can be summarized as follows when a client joins a network it executes the 4 way handshake to negotiate a fresh encryption key it will install this key after receiving message 3 of the 4 way handshake once the key is installed it will be used to encrypt normal data frames using an encryption protocol however because messages may be lost or dropped the access point ap will retransmit message 3 if it did not receive an appropriate response as acknowledgment as a result the client may receive message 3 multiple times each time it receives this message it will reinstall the same encryption key and thereby reset the incremental transmit packet number nonce and receive replay counter used by the encryption protocol we show that an attacker can force these nonce resets by collecting and replaying retransmissions of message 3 of the 4 way handshake by forcing nonce reuse in this manner the encryption protocol can be attacked e g packets can be replayed decrypted and or forged the same technique can also be used to attack the group key peerkey tdls and fast bss transition handshake practical impact in our opinion the most widespread and practically impactful attack is the key reinstallation attack against the 4 way handshake we base this judgement on two observations first during our own research we found that most clients were affected by it second adversaries can use this attack to decrypt packets sent by clients allowing them to intercept sensitive information such as passwords or cookies decryption of packets is possible because a key reinstallation attack causes the transmit nonces sometimes also called packet numbers or initialization vectors to be reset to their initial value as a result the same encryption key is used with nonce values that have already been used in the past in turn this causes all encryption protocols of wpa2 to reuse keystream when encrypting packets in case a message that reuses keystream has known content it becomes trivial to derive the used keystream this keystream can then be used to decrypt messages with the same nonce when there is no known content it is harder to decrypt packets although still possible in several cases e g english text can still be decrypted in practice finding packets with known content is not a problem so it should be assumed that any packet can be decrypted the ability to decrypt packets can be used to decrypt tcp syn packets this allows an adversary to obtain the tcp sequence numbers of a connection and hijack tcp connections as a result even though wpa2 is used the adversary can now perform one of the most common attacks against open wi fi networks injecting malicious data into unencrypted http connections for example an attacker can abuse this to inject ransomware or malware into websites that the victim is visiting if the victim uses either the wpa tkip or gcmp encryption protocol instead of aes ccmp the impact is especially catastrophic against these encryption protocols nonce reuse enables an adversary to not only decrypt but also to forge and inject packets moreover because gcmp uses the same authentication key in both communication directions and this key can be recovered if nonces are reused it is especially affected note that support for gcmp is currently being rolled out under the name wireless gigabit wigig and is expected to be adopted at a high rate over the next few years the direction in which packets can be decrypted and possibly forged depends on the handshake being attacked simplified when attacking the 4 way handshake we can decrypt and forge packets sent by the client when attacking the fast bss transition ft handshake we can decrypt and forge packets sent towards the client finally most of our attacks also allow the replay of unicast broadcast and multicast frames for further details see section 6 of our research paper note that our attacks do not recover the password of the wi fi network they also do not recover any parts of the fresh encryption key that is negotiated during the 4 way handshake android and linux our attack is especially catastrophic against version 2 4 and above of wpa_supplicant a wi fi client commonly used on linux here the client will install an all zero encryption key instead of reinstalling the real key this vulnerability appears to be caused by a remark in the wi fi standard that suggests to clear the encryption key from memory once it has been installed for the first time when the client now receives a retransmitted message 3 of the 4 way handshake it will reinstall the now cleared encryption key effectively installing an all zero key because android uses wpa_supplicant android 6 0 and above also contains this vulnerability this makes it trivial to intercept and manipulate traffic sent by these linux and android devices note that currently 50 of android devices are vulnerable to this exceptionally devastating variant of our attack assigned cve identifiers the following common vulnerabilities and exposures cve identifiers were assigned to track which products are affected by specific instantiations of our key reinstallation attack cve 2017 13077 reinstallation of the pairwise encryption key ptk tk in the 4 way handshake cve 2017 13078 reinstallation of the group key gtk in the 4 way handshake cve 2017 13079 reinstallation of the integrity group key igtk in the 4 way handshake cve 2017 13080 reinstallation of the group key gtk in the group key handshake cve 2017 13081 reinstallation of the integrity group key igtk in the group key handshake cve 2017 13082 accepting a retransmitted fast bss transition ft reassociation request and reinstalling the pairwise encryption key ptk tk while processing it cve 2017 13084 reinstallation of the stk key in the peerkey handshake cve 2017 13086 reinstallation of the tunneled direct link setup tdls peerkey tpk key in the tdls handshake cve 2017 13087 reinstallation of the group key gtk when processing a wireless network management wnm sleep mode response frame cve 2017 13088 reinstallation of the integrity group key igtk when processing a wireless network management wnm sleep mode response frame note that each cve identifier represents a specific instantiation of a key reinstallation attack this means each cve id describes a specific protocol vulnerability and therefore many vendors are affected by each individual cve id you can also read vulnerability note vu 228519 of cert cc for additional details on which products are known to be affected paper our research paper behind the attack is titled key reinstallation attacks forcing nonce reuse in wpa2 and will be presented at the computer and communications security ccs conference on wednesday 1 november 2017 although this paper is made public now it was already submitted for review on 19 may 2017 after this only minor changes were made as a result the findings in the paper are already several months old in the meantime we have found easier techniques to carry out our key reinstallation attack against the 4 way handshake with our novel attack technique it is now trivial to exploit implementations that only accept encrypted retransmissions of message 3 of the 4 way handshake in particular this means that attacking macos and openbsd is significantly easier than discussed in the paper we would like to highlight the following addendums and errata addendum wpa_supplicant v2 6 and android 6 0 linux s wpa_supplicant v2 6 is also vulnerable to the installation of an all zero encryption key in the 4 way handshake this was discovered by john a van boxtel as a result all android versions higher than 6 0 are also affected by the attack and hence can be tricked into installing an all zero encryption key the new attack works by injecting a forged message 1 with the same anonce as used in the original message 1 before forwarding the retransmitted message 3 to the victim addendum other vulnerable handshakes after our initial research as reported in the paper we discovered that the tdls handshake and wnm sleep mode response frame are also vulnerable to key reinstallation attacks selected errata in figure 9 at stage 3 of the attack the frame transmitted from the adversary to the authenticator should say reassoreq anonce snonce mic instead of reassoresp section 3 1 figure 3 contains a simplified description of the state machine not figure 2 section 4 2 it is essential that the broadcast frame we replay is sent after not before the retransmission of group message 1 a similar change should be made in section 4 3 again it is essential that the broadcast frame we want to replay is sent after not before the retransmission of group message 1 citation example and bibtex entry please cite our research paper and not this website or cite both you can use the following example citation or bibtex entry mathy vanhoef and frank piessens 2017 key reinstallation attacks forcing nonce reuse in wpa2 in proceedings of the 24th acm conference on computer and communications security ccs acm inproceedings vanhoef ccs2017 author mathy vanhoef and frank piessens title key reinstallation attacks forcing nonce reuse in wpa2 booktitle proceedings of the 24th acm conference on computer and communications security ccs year 2017 publisher acm tools we have made scripts to detect whether an implementation of the 4 way handshake group key handshake or fast bss transition ft handshake is vulnerable to key reinstallation attacks these scripts are available on github and contain detailed instructions on how to use them we also made a proof of concept script that exploits the all zero key re installation present in certain android and linux devices this script is the one that we used in the demonstration video it will be released once everyone has had a reasonable chance to update their devices and we have had a chance to prepare the code repository for release we remark that the reliability of our proof of concept script may depend on how close the victim is to the real network if the victim is very close to the real network the script may fail because the victim will always directly communicate with the real network even if the victim is forced onto a different wi fi channel than this network q a is there a higher resolution version of the logo do we now need wpa3 should i change my wi fi password i m using wpa2 with only aes that s also vulnerable you use the word we in this website who is we is my device vulnerable what if there are no security updates for my router or access point or if it does not support 802 11r is it sufficient to patch only the access point or to patch only clients can we modify an access point to prevent attacks against the client how did you discover these vulnerabilities the 4 way handshake was mathematically proven as secure how is your attack possible some attacks in the paper seem hard if an attacker can do a man in the middle attack why can t they just decrypt all the data does an attacker to have be near your network in order to attack it are people exploiting this in the wild should i temporarily use wep until my devices are patched will the wi fi standard be updated to address this is the wi fi alliance also addressing these vulnerabilities why did you use match com as an example in the demonstration video how can these types of bugs be prevented why the domain name krackattacks com did you get bug bounties for this how does this attack compare to other attacks against wpa2 are other protocols also affected by key reinstallation attacks when did you first notify vendors about the vulnerability why did openbsd silently release a patch before the embargo so you expect to find other wi fi vulnerabilities where can i learn more about key reinstallation attacks is there a higher resolution version of the logo yes there is and a big thank you goes to darlee urbiztondo for conceptualizing and designing the logo do we now need wpa3 no luckily implementations can be patched in a backwards compatible manner this means a patched client can still communicate with an unpatched access point ap and vice versa in other words a patched client or access point sends exactly the same handshake messages as before and at exactly the same moment in time however the security updates will assure a key is only installed once preventing our attack so again update all your devices once security updates are available finally although an unpatched client can still connect to a patched ap and vice versa both the client and ap must be patched to defend against all attacks should i change my wi fi password changing the password of your wi fi network does not prevent or mitigate the attack so you do not have to update the password of your wi fi network instead you should make sure all your devices are updated and you should also update the firmware of your router nevertheless after updating both your client devices and your router it s never a bad idea to change the wi fi password i m using wpa2 with only aes that s also vulnerable yes that network configuration is also vulnerable the attack works against both wpa1 and wpa2 against personal and enterprise networks and against any cipher suite being used wpa tkip aes ccmp and gcmp so everyone should update their devices to prevent the attack you use the w...