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practices that institute linguistic intentionality using a normative metavocabulary these are not the only options though early in expressivism pragmatism and representationalism price cites hume as an example of the kind of subject naturalism he aspires to pursue but of course in brandom s typology hume is not a naturalist but an empiricist hume privileges subjective rather than objective base explanatory resources in the cognitive domain experience and in the practical domain sentiment i want to align with the more subjectivist empiricist tradition that as i see it runs from hume through adam smith to hegel giving an account of norms as instituted by subjective practices of recognitive desire and sentiment i don t want to uniformly privilege that kind of subjectivist metavocabulary my framework pluralist methodological view is that we should be mobile between metavocabularies as suits our explanatory needs but i think there are philosophical and social theoretic riches in this more subjectivist tradition which brandom is denying himself for no adequate reason one of the things i want to do on the blog then is try to assemble a more systematic and worked through set of resources for in brandom s idiom making use of a subjectivist metavocabulary for specifying psychological actions and dispositions which can deploy or institute norms i want to see hume and adam smith as offering a subjectivist pragmatic metavocabulary for the non reductive explanation of normative content in precisely the sense captured by brandom s simple meaning use diagram that s not the goal of this post though in this post i want to clear some ground by giving a basic typology of simple relations between vocabularies in brandom s schema so i ve already talked about different projects of semantic reductionism i m working with three major categories of philosophical vocabulary the subjectivist the naturalistic and the normative one could propose a philosophical program of semantically reducing any one of these to any one of the other s one could also propose philosophical reductionisms within any one of the vocabularies the reduction of chemistry to particle physics with which we began would be an example of such a project semantically reducing one naturalistic vocabulary to another naturalistic vocabulary brandom s characterisation in his article action norms and practical reasoning of the humean as reducing all normative talk to instrumental normative talk would be an example of a reductionism within a normative vocabulary one could think here of david lewis s claim that to value something is just to desire to desire it this is a quite simple attempted reduction of norm talk which appears to contrast with desire talk to desire talk these are semantic reductionisms but there are also pragmatically mediated relations between vocabularies pragmatically mediated can here be understood in the broad sense i gestured to earlier incorporating intra not just inter agent behaviours here again we can in principle swap out any of the major categories of vocabulary in the role of target vocabulary and pragmatic metavocabulary and again we can do more fine grained analysis than that carrying out pragmatically mediated analytic reductions between sub categories of vocabulary for example we have already seen that brandom understands humeanism as a reduction of all forms of normative vocabulary to instrumentalist vocabulary but what is the nature of this reductionism could we not understand the humean project as making the following claim an instrumentalist normative metavocabulary is sufficient to specify the practices that institute non instrumentalist norms in this scenario a humean language user is legitimately making non instrumentalist commitments but the practices via which they are making those commitments can be fully specified using a wholly instrumentalist metavocabulary i want to suggest that this is one possible way we could interpret what hegel is trying to do in the moral valet passage and related sections of the phenomenology seen like this the moral valet s reductionist error involves mistaking a pragmatic metavocabulary for a semantic base vocabulary i m not sure that s the right way to understand the passage but i think this interpretation ought to at least be on the table posted by duncan filed in philosophy 2 comments preliminary notes on the frankfurt school june 15 2026 i ve read some works from the frankfurt school but not enough and i don t feel i really have an adequate grasp of the tradition i want to fix that but i ve got a lot to read this post follows my usual practice of articulating some basic views to start with which i can then modify as necessary start with orthodox marxism orthodox marxism had as its goal an emancipated communist society let s say very schematically that there were two major ways in which the tradition understood our historical trajectory towards that future society first there was the idea of the proletariat as agent of history a theory of historical change via class conflict which vested its hopes in proletarian collective action often via a kind of practical standpoint theory second there was the idea that the forces of production drove history tension between the forces of production and the relations of production would ultimately result in the transformation of the latter the frankfurt theorists believed that orthodox marxism had been discredited along both of these dimensions with respect to the proletariat as agent of history there were several major shocks to the orthodox marxist understanding of revolutionary class formation there was the collapse of the second international over wwi as national identity and international conflict largely won out over class identity and class conflict there was the crushing of the left wing of the german revolution in 1918 19 then during weimar there was the emergence and then the internal victory of fascism as a mass movement the frankfurt school theorists felt that marxism had failed to offer an adequate analysis of fascism as a mass collective movement which was exterminatory rather than emancipatory in order to address this shortcoming they sought to link marxism up to psychoanalytic resources resources that could better analyse the role of unreason in political and social life with respect to the forces of production the frankfurt theorists were horrified by the deployment of scientific technical reason and technological resources to oppressive ends the forces of production were meant to be the basis for liberation but were central to totalitarian and genocidal barbarism the frankfurt theorists therefore rethought the orthodox marxist faith in technology what if technology and scientific reason were themselves in some sense sources rather than simply tools of oppression this line of thought led them to a very broad critique of instrumental reason this critique of instrumental reason i think came in two waves the first generation theorists offered a very broad critique indeed they can sometimes sound like they think cognition in general is a form of domination habermas the major second generation figure sought to refine the critique he differentiated between two forms of action instrumental and communicative the problem for habermas was when the former came to dominate and suppress the latter this is all very rough as i say i need to do a lot of reading reacting however to this rough sketch i want to articulate my own positioning i want to broadly align with the frankfurt theorists on the point about collective subjects the proletarian standpoint theory of classical marxism was indeed very misguided proletarian class consciousness cannot be assumed to point to emancipatory ends marxism did indeed fail to offer an adequate analysis of fascism the frankfurt theorists are right that psychoanalytic resources can illuminate these issues and they have specific insights concerning fascist unreason by contrast i want to reject the frankfurt theorists very broad critique of scientific reason and technology the first wave theorists seem to me to be just wildly excessive on this score and even habermas with his distinction between instrumental and communicative reason seems too strong to me so i want to adopt a stance that is much more friendly towards science technology and instrumental reason than were the frankfurt theorists but that embraces their efforts to analyse in social psychological terms the forces of unreason at work in modern history i need to read a lot more posted by duncan filed in critical theory social theory leave a comment rationalisms strong and weak june 7 2026 last month i published a post on four forms of rationalism i m pretty happy with the typology i articulated in that post no doubt it s all very obvious and crude but i ve found it clarifying however in that post i said that i only endorsed the fourth of these senses of rationalism the idea that all assertions are in principle up for contestation and defence i rejected the other three senses of rationalism the idea that we have a faculty of reason with special epistemic standing which can somehow latch on to the true nature of reality the idea that the true nature of reality is rationally structured such that it is definitely available for cognition and the idea that some normative rational providence is at work in the universe in that post i therefore only endorsed one of the four available senses of rationalism i stand by that view as articulated in the post however it occurs to me that i formulated each of these three forms of rationalism in an extremely strong more or less metaphysical way i do reject those metaphysical positions but each of these senses of rationalism has other weaker non metaphysical versions that s what i want to talk about briefly in this post take the first sense of rationalism to start with i do think we should reject the idea that we have some specifically reliable faculty of reason which intrinsically latches on to truth some kind of platonist or cartesian view still in a weaker sense i definitely think we can understand things better by thinking about them carefully likewise mathematics a field which is basically exclusively a priori ratiocination is pretty clearly a real field of study in which studying basically just means thinking in that sense i endorse a weak version of this sense of rationalism on the third sense of rational the providential normative agency structuring reality this is the form of rationalism i most strongly reject i m emphatically on voltaire s side in the standoff between leibniz s theodicy and the perspective of candide i even reject brandom s secularisation of hegel s reworking of this kind of theodicy even brandom s secularised and retrospective whiggism is too strong for my tastes as i ve written about on the blog before still there is a weak sense of rationalism available here too the idea that forms of social organisation can be more or less rational in some specified sense or senses and we can evaluate social structures using that criterion i do endorse some version of this position with of course much to be settled about the relevant sense of rational so i m willing to endorse a relatively weak sense of rationalism even in this normative space what interests me most right now though is the second sense of rationalism the one expressed by galileo the idea that reality itself is structured in a way that makes it rationally intelligible more specifically that the book of the universe is written in the language of mathematics as i said in that previous post i strongly reject both the spinoza or hegel style metaphysical rationalism that we have reason to think the world is intrinsically rationally intelligible and also the heidegger style anti rationalism that we have philosophical reason to think the world is specifically non intelligible i do think we have pretty good practical reasons to think the world might well be at some level unintelligible we can observe other creatures interact with features of the world that are intelligible to us but clearly exceed the grasp of those creatures cognitive resources or categories why wouldn t we then reflexively apply this same perspective to ourselves and conclude that there are almost certainly features of reality that escape our own cognitive capacities just as my cat is not going to be able to make sense of the text on my computer screen still this is not a heidegger style anti rationalist argument for one thing heidegger is ultimately aligned with the metaphysical idea that the deep structure of the world is in some sense accessible to us he just denies that it s rationally accessible rather it is a pragmatist or if you prefer pragmatised kantian argument about cognitive limits even if we reject strong metaphysical rationalisms and anti rationalisms though there is still the question how much can we make rational sense of more narrowly in connection to galileo s claim even if we reject the idea that we somehow know as a metaphysical truth that the book of the universe is written in the language of mathematics how much sense can we make of the universe using those tools here i want to cite two relevant texts on is gibbard and varian s classic methodological paper economic modeling 1978 in which they make the case for the explanatory value of a particular subcategory of economic model models as caricatures for gibbard and varian the point of a caricatural model is that it does not catch all the details complexity or particularity of reality but rather foregrounds specific features of reality in a way that is explanatorily helpful to us as we try to understand the forces and phenomena at play in our social world i endorse this methodological perspective the second text is a passage from herbert simon s the sciences of the artificial one of the best passages i ve read in the philosophy of science here s simon the more we are willing to abstract from the detail of a set of phenomena the easier it becomes to simulate the phenomena moreover we do not have to know or guess at all the internal structure of the system but only that part of it that is crucial to the abstraction it is fortunate that this is so for if it were not the topdown strategy that built the natural sciences over the past three centuries would have been infeasible we knew a great deal about the gross physical and chemical behavior of matter before we had a knowledge of molecules a great deal about molecular chemistry before we had an atomic theory and a great deal about atoms before we had any theory of elementary particles if indeed we have such a theory today this skyhook skyscraper construction of science from the roof down to the yet unconstructed foundations was possible because the behavior of the system at each level depended on only a very approximate simplified abstracted characterization of the system at the level...