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compatibilists are committed only to the power to do something otherwise if different circumstances had actually obtained in the past 46 using t f for true and false and for undecided there are exactly nine positions regarding determinism free will that consist of any two of these three possibilities 47 galen strawson s table 47 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 determinism d t f t f t f free will fw f t t f f t incompatibilism may occupy any of the nine positions except 5 8 or 3 which last corresponds to soft determinism position 1 is hard determinism and position 2 is libertarianism 1 adds to the table the contention that d implies fw is untrue and 2 adds the contention that fw implies d is untrue position 9 may be called hard incompatibilism if one interprets as meaning both concepts are of dubious value compatibilism itself may occupy any of the nine positions that is there is no logical contradiction between determinism and free will and either or both may be true or false in principle but compatibilism is most commonly understood to hold that some form of determinism is true and yet we have some form of free will position 3 48 a domino s movement is determined completely by laws of physics alex rosenberg makes an extrapolation of physical determinism as inferred on the macroscopic scale by the behaviour of a set of dominoes to neural activity in the brain where if the brain is nothing but a complex physical object whose states are as much governed by physical laws as any other physical object then what goes on in our heads is as fixed and determined by prior events as what goes on when one domino topples another in a long row of them 49 physical determinism is disputed by prominent interpretations of quantum mechanics and while not necessarily representative of intrinsic indeterminism in nature fundamental limits of precision in measurement are inherent in the uncertainty principle 50 but the relevance of such prospective indeterminate activity to free will is contested 51 even when chaos theory is introduced to magnify the effects of such microscopic events 31 52 below these positions are examined in more detail 47 hard determinism edit main article hard determinism a simplified taxonomy of philosophical positions regarding free will and determinism determinism can be divided into causal logical and theological determinism 53 corresponding to each of these different meanings there arises a different problem for free will 54 hard determinism is the claim that determinism is true and that it is incompatible with free will so free will does not exist although hard determinism generally refers to nomological determinism see causal determinism below it can include all forms of determinism that necessitate the future in its entirety 55 relevant forms of determinism include causal determinism the idea that everything is caused by prior conditions making it impossible for anything else to happen 56 in its most common form nomological or scientific determinism future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature such determinism is sometimes illustrated by the thought experiment of laplace s demon imagine an entity that knows all facts about the past and the present and knows all natural laws that govern the universe if the laws of nature were determinate then such an entity would be able to use this knowledge to foresee the future down to the smallest detail 57 58 a good way to conceptualize this is to think about how scientists know the speed and position of planets using known laws of orbital dynamics scientists know where the planet will be in the future at any given time this concept is then extrapolated to include everything in the universe logical determinism the notion that all propositions whether about the past present or future are either true or false the problem of free will in this context is the problem of how choices can be free given that what one does in the future is already determined as true or false in the present 54 theological determinism the idea that the future is already determined either by a creator deity decreeing or knowing its outcome in advance 59 60 the problem of free will in this context is the problem of how our actions can be free if there is a being who has determined them for us in advance or if they are already set in time other forms of determinism are more relevant to compatibilism such as biological determinism the idea that all behaviors beliefs and desires are fixed by our genetic endowment and our biochemical makeup the latter of which is affected by both genes and environment cultural determinism and psychological determinism 54 combinations and syntheses of determinist theses such as bio environmental determinism are even more common suggestions have been made that hard determinism need not maintain strict determinism since something similar like what is informally known as adequate determinism is perhaps more relevant 32 despite this hard determinism has grown less popular in present times given scientific suggestions that determinism is false 29 metaphysical libertarianism edit main article libertarianism metaphysics various definitions of free will that have been proposed for metaphysical libertarianism agent substance causal 61 centered accounts 62 and efforts of will theory 31 along with examples of other common free will positions compatibilism 19 hard determinism 63 and hard incompatibilism 35 red circles represent mental states blue circles represent physical states arrows describe causal interaction one kind of incompatibilism metaphysical libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires that the agent be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances 64 accounts of libertarianism subdivide into non physical theories and physical or naturalistic theories non physical theories hold that the events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation which requires that the world is not closed under physics this includes interactionist dualism which claims that some non physical mind will or soul overrides physical causality physical determinism implies there is only one possible future and is therefore not compatible with libertarian free will as consequent of incompatibilism metaphysical libertarian explanations that do not involve dispensing with physicalism require physical indeterminism such as probabilistic subatomic particle behavior theory unknown to many of the early writers on free will incompatibilist theories can be categorised based on the type of indeterminism they require uncaused events non deterministically caused events and agent substance caused events 61 non causal theories edit non causal accounts of incompatibilist free will do not require a free action to be caused by either an agent or a physical event they either rely upon a world that is not causally closed or physical indeterminism non causal accounts often claim that each intentional action requires a choice or volition a willing trying or endeavoring on behalf of the agent such as the cognitive component of lifting one s arm 65 66 such intentional actions are interpreted as free actions it has been suggested however that such acting cannot be said to exercise control over anything in particular according to non causal accounts the causation by the agent cannot be analysed in terms of causation by mental states or events including desire belief intention of something in particular but rather is considered a matter of spontaneity and creativity the exercise of intent in such intentional actions is not that which determines their freedom rather intentional actions are self generating the actish feel of some intentional actions do not constitute that event s activeness or the agent s exercise of active control rather they might be brought about by direct stimulation of someone s brain in the absence of any relevant desire or intention on the part of that person 61 another question raised by such non causal theory is how an agent acts upon reason if said intentional actions are spontaneous some non causal explanations involve invoking panpsychism the theory that a quality of mind is associated with all particles and pervades the entire universe in both animate and inanimate entities event causal theories edit event causal accounts of incompatibilist free will typically rely upon physicalist models of mind like those of the compatibilist yet they presuppose physical indeterminism in which certain indeterministic events are said to be caused by the agent a number of event causal accounts of free will have been created referenced here as deliberative indeterminism centred accounts and efforts of will theory 61 the first two accounts do not require free will to be a fundamental constituent of the universe ordinary randomness is appealed to as supplying the elbow room that libertarians believe necessary a first common objection to event causal accounts is that the indeterminism could be destructive and could therefore diminish control by the agent rather than provide it related to the problem of origination a second common objection to these models is that it is questionable whether such indeterminism could add any value to deliberation over that which is already present in a deterministic world deliberative indeterminism asserts that the indeterminism is confined to an earlier stage in the decision process 67 68 this is intended to provide an indeterminate set of possibilities to choose from while not risking the introduction of luck random decision making the selection process is deterministic although it may be based on earlier preferences established by the same process deliberative indeterminism has been referenced by daniel dennett 69 and john martin fischer 70 an obvious objection to such a view is that an agent cannot be assigned ownership over their decisions or preferences used to make those decisions to any greater degree than that of a compatibilist model centred accounts propose that for any given decision between two possibilities the strength of reason will be considered for each option yet there is still a probability the weaker candidate will be chosen 62 71 72 73 74 75 76 an obvious objection to such a view is that decisions are explicitly left up to chance and origination or responsibility cannot be assigned for any given decision efforts of will theory is related to the role of will power in decision making it suggests that the indeterminacy of agent volition processes could map to the indeterminacy of certain physical events and the outcomes of these events could therefore be considered caused by the agent models of volition have been constructed in which it is seen as a particular kind of complex high level process with an element of physical indeterminism an example of this approach is that of robert kane where he hypothesizes that in each case the indeterminism is functioning as a hindrance or obstacle to her realizing one of her purposes a hindrance or obstacle in the form of resistance within her will which must be overcome by effort 31 according to robert kane such ultimate responsibility is a required condition for free will 77 an important factor in such a theory is that the agent cannot be reduced to physical neuronal events but rather mental processes are said to provide an equally valid account of the determination of outcome as their physical processes see non reductive physicalism although at the time quantum mechanics and physical indeterminism was only in the initial stages of acceptance in his book miracles a preliminary study c s lewis stated the logical possibility that if the physical world were proved indeterministic this would provide an entry point to describe an action of a non physical entity on physical reality 78 indeterministic physical models particularly those involving quantum indeterminacy introduce random occurrences at an atomic or subatomic level these events might affect brain activity and could seemingly allow incompatibilist free will if the apparent indeterminacy of some mental processes for instance subjective perceptions of control in conscious volition map to the underlying indeterminacy of the physical construct but this relationship requires a causative role over probabilities that is questionable 79 and it is far from established that brain activity responsible for human action can be affected by such events moreover these incompatibilist models depend upon the relationship between action and conscious volition as studied in the neuroscience of free will it is evident that observation may disturb the outcome of the observation itself rendering limited our ability to identify causality 50 niels bohr one of the main architects of quantum theory suggested however that there is no connection between indeterminism of nature and freedom of will 51 agent substance causal theories edit agent substance causal accounts of incompatibilist free will rely upon substance dualism in their description of mind the agent is assumed power to intervene in the physical world 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 agent substance causal accounts have been suggested by both george berkeley 88 and thomas reid 89 it is required that what the agent causes is not causally determined by prior events it is also required that the agent s causing of that event is not causally determined by prior events a number of problems have been identified with this view first it is difficult to establish the reason for any given choice by the agent which suggests they may be random or determined by luck without an underlying basis for the decision second it has been questioned whether physical events can be caused by an external substance or mind a common problem associated with interactionalist dualism hard incompatibilism edit hard incompatibilism is the idea that free will cannot exist whether the world is deterministic or not derk pereboom has defended hard incompatibilism identifying a variety of positions where free will is irrelevant to indeterminism determinism among them the following determinism d is true d does not imply we lack free will f but in fact we do lack f d is true d does not imply we lack f but in fact we don t know if we have f d is true and we do have f d is true we have f and f implies d d is unproven but we have f d isn t true we do have f and would have f even if d were true d isn t true we don t have f but f is compatible with d derk pereboom living without free will 35 p xvi pereboom calls positions 3 and 4 soft determinism position 1 a form of hard determinism position 6 a form of classical libertarianism and any position that includes having f as compatibilism john locke denied that the phrase free will made any sense compare with theological noncognitivism a similar stance on the existence of god he also took the view that the tru...
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