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assumed to be denied as a consequence or that the weaker version does not constitute theological determinism at all 55 theological determinism can also be seen as a form of causal determinism in which the antecedent conditions are the nature and will of god 56 with respect to free will and the classification of theological compatibilism incompatibilism below theological determinism is the thesis that god exists and has infallible knowledge of all true propositions including propositions about our future actions more minimal criteria designed to encapsulate all forms of theological determinism 32 a simplified taxonomy of philosophical positions regarding free will and theological determinism 33 there are various implications for metaphysical libertarian free will as consequent of theological determinism and its philosophical interpretation strong theological determinism is not compatible with metaphysical libertarian free will and is a form of hard theological determinism equivalent to theological fatalism below it claims that free will does not exist and god has absolute control over a person s actions hard theological determinism is similar in implication to hard determinism although it does not invalidate compatibilist free will 33 hard theological determinism is a form of theological incompatibilism see figure top left weak theological determinism is either compatible or incompatible with metaphysical libertarian free will depending upon one s philosophical interpretation of omniscience and as such is interpreted as either a form of hard theological determinism known as theological fatalism or as soft theological determinism terminology used for clarity only soft theological determinism claims that humans have free will to choose their actions holding that god while knowing their actions before they happen does not affect the outcome god s providence is compatible with voluntary choice soft theological determinism is known as theological compatibilism see figure top right a rejection of theological determinism or divine foreknowledge is classified as theological incompatibilism also see figure bottom and is relevant to a more general discussion of free will 33 the basic argument for theological fatalism in the case of weak theological determinism is as follows assume divine foreknowledge or omniscience infallible foreknowledge implies destiny it is known for certain what one will do destiny eliminates alternate possibility one cannot do otherwise assert incompatibility with metaphysical libertarian free will this argument is very often accepted as a basis for theological incompatibilism denying either libertarian free will or divine foreknowledge omniscience and therefore theological determinism on the other hand theological compatibilism must attempt to find problems with it the formal version of the argument rests on a number of premises many of which have received some degree of contention theological compatibilist responses have included deny the truth value of future contingents although this denies foreknowledge and therefore theological determinism assert differences in non temporal knowledge space time independence an approach taken for example by boethius 105 thomas aquinas 106 and c s lewis 107 deny the principle of alternate possibilities if you cannot do otherwise when you do an act you do not act freely for example a human observer could in principle have a machine that could detect what will happen in the future but the existence of this machine or their use of it has no influence on the outcomes of events 108 in the definition of compatibilism and incompatibilism the literature often fails to distinguish between physical determinism and higher level forms of determinism predeterminism theological determinism etc as such hard determinism with respect to theological determinism or hard theological determinism above might be classified as hard incompatibilism with respect to physical determinism if no claim was made regarding the internal causality or determinism of the universe or even compatibilism if freedom from the constraint of determinism was not considered necessary for free will if not hard determinism itself by the same principle metaphysical libertarianism a form of incompatibilism with respect to physical determinism might be classified as compatibilism with respect to theological determinism if it was assumed such free will events were pre ordained and therefore were destined to occur but of which whose outcomes were not predestined or determined by god if hard theological determinism is accepted if it was assumed instead that such outcomes were predestined by god then metaphysical libertarianism is not however possible and would require reclassification as hard incompatibilism for example given that the universe is still assumed to be indeterministic although the classification of hard determinism is technically valid also 55 mind body problem edit main article mind body problem see also philosophy of mind monism and physicalism rené descartes the idea of free will is one aspect of the mind body problem that is consideration of the relation between mind for example consciousness memory and judgment and body for example the human brain and nervous system philosophical models of mind are divided into physical and non physical expositions cartesian dualism holds that the mind is a nonphysical substance the seat of consciousness and intelligence and is not identical with physical states of the brain or body it is suggested that although the two worlds do interact each retains some measure of autonomy under cartesian dualism external mind is responsible for bodily action although unconscious brain activity is often caused by external events for example the instantaneous reaction to being burned 109 cartesian dualism implies that the physical world is not deterministic and in which external mind controls at least some physical events providing an interpretation of incompatibilist free will stemming from cartesian dualism a formulation sometimes called interactionalist dualism suggests a two way interaction that some physical events cause some mental acts and some mental acts cause some physical events one modern vision of the possible separation of mind and body is the three world formulation of popper 110 cartesian dualism and popper s three worlds are two forms of what is called epistemological pluralism that is the notion that different epistemological methodologies are necessary to attain a full description of the world other forms of epistemological pluralist dualism include psychophysical parallelism and epiphenomenalism epistemological pluralism is one view in which the mind body problem is not reducible to the concepts of the natural sciences a contrasting approach is called physicalism physicalism is a philosophical theory holding that everything that exists is no more extensive than its physical properties that is that there are no non physical substances for example physically independent minds physicalism can be reductive or non reductive reductive physicalism is grounded in the idea that everything in the world can actually be reduced analytically to its fundamental physical or material basis alternatively non reductive physicalism asserts that mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties that mental states such as qualia are not ontologically reducible to physical states although one might suppose that mental states and neurological states are different in kind that does not rule out the possibility that mental states are correlated with neurological states in one such construction anomalous monism mental events supervene on physical events describing the emergence of mental properties correlated with physical properties implying causal reducibility non reductive physicalism is therefore often categorised as property dualism rather than monism yet other types of property dualism do not adhere to the causal reducibility of mental states see epiphenomenalism incompatibilism requires a distinction between the mental and the physical being a commentary on the incompatibility of determined physical reality and one s presumably distinct experience of will secondarily metaphysical libertarian free will must assert influence on physical reality and where mind is responsible for such influence as opposed to ordinary system randomness it must be distinct from body to accomplish this both substance and property dualism offer such a distinction and those particular models thereof that are not causally inert with respect to the physical world provide a basis for illustrating incompatibilist free will i e interactionalist dualism and non reductive physicalism it has been noted that the laws of physics have yet to resolve the hard problem of consciousness 111 solving the hard problem of consciousness involves determining how physiological processes such as ions flowing across the nerve membrane cause us to have experiences 112 according to some intricately related to the hard problem of consciousness the hard problem of free will represents the core problem of conscious free will does conscious volition impact the material world 17 others however argue that consciousness plays a far smaller role in human life than western culture has tended to believe 113 compatibilism edit main article compatibilism thomas hobbes was a classical compatibilist compatibilists maintain that determinism is compatible with free will they believe freedom can be present or absent in a situation for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics for instance courts of law make judgments about whether individuals are acting under their own free will under certain circumstances without bringing in metaphysics similarly political liberty is a non metaphysical concept 114 likewise some compatibilists define free will as freedom to act according to one s determined motives without hindrance from other individuals so for example aristotle in his nicomachean ethics 115 and the stoic chrysippus 116 in contrast the incompatibilist positions are concerned with a sort of metaphysically free will which compatibilists claim has never been coherently defined compatibilists argue that determinism does not matter though they disagree among themselves about what in turn does matter to be a compatibilist one need not endorse any particular conception of free will but only deny that determinism is at odds with free will 117 although there are various impediments to exercising one s choices free will does not imply freedom of action freedom of choice freedom to select one s will is logically separate from freedom to implement that choice freedom to enact one s will although not all writers observe this distinction 26 nonetheless some philosophers have defined free will as the absence of various impediments some modern compatibilists such as harry frankfurt and daniel dennett argue free will is simply freely choosing to do what constraints allow one to do in other words a coerced agent s choices can still be free if such coercion coincides with the agent s personal intentions and desires 37 118 free will as lack of physical restraint edit most classical compatibilists such as thomas hobbes claim that a person is acting on the person s own will only when it is the desire of that person to do the act and also possible for the person to be able to do otherwise if the person had decided to hobbes sometimes attributes such compatibilist freedom to each individual and not to some abstract notion of will asserting for example that no liberty can be inferred to the will desire or inclination but the liberty of the man which consisteth in this that he finds no stop in doing what he has the will desire or inclination to doe sic 119 in articulating this crucial proviso david hume writes this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains 120 similarly voltaire in his dictionnaire philosophique claimed that liberty then is only and can be only the power to do what one will he asked would you have everything at the pleasure of a million blind caprices for him free will or liberty is only the power of acting what is this power it is the effect of the constitution and present state of our organs compatibilism has also been defended by christian list list makes a distinction between physical possibility and agential possibility and argues that free will is a higher level phenomenon on par with agency and intentionality rather than a physical one 121 free will as a psychological state edit compatibilism often regards the agent free as virtue of their reason some explanations of free will focus on the internal causality of the mind with respect to higher order brain processing the interaction between conscious and unconscious brain activity 122 likewise some modern compatibilists in psychology have tried to revive traditionally accepted struggles of free will with the formation of character 123 compatibilist free will has also been attributed to our natural sense of agency where one must believe they are an agent in order to function and develop a theory of mind 124 125 the notion of levels of decision is presented in a different manner by frankfurt 118 frankfurt argues for a version of compatibilism called the hierarchical mesh the idea is that an individual can have conflicting desires at a first order level and also have a desire about the various first order desires a second order desire to the effect that one of the desires prevails over the others a person s will is identified with their effective first order desire that is the one they act on and this will is free if it was the desire the person wanted to act upon that is the person s second order desire was effective so for example there are wanton addicts unwilling addicts and willing addicts all three groups may have the conflicting first order desires to want to take the drug they are addicted to and to not want to take it the first group wanton addicts have no second order desire not to take the drug the second group unwilling addicts have a second order desire not to take the drug while the third group willing addicts have a second order desire to take it according to frankfurt the members of the first group are devoid of will and therefore are no longer persons the members of the second group freely desire not to take the drug but their will is overcome by the addiction finally the members of the third group willingly take the drug they are addicted to frankfurt s theory can ramify to any number of levels critics of the theory point out that there is no certainty that conflicts will not arise even at the higher order levels of desire and preference 126 others argue that frankfurt offers no adequate explanation of how the various levels in the hierarchy mesh together 127 free will as unpredictability e...