Meta tags:

Headings (most frequently used words):

later, of, duns, scotus, contents, life, work, metaphysics, theology, veneration, reputation, and, influence, in, popular, media, bibliography, see, also, notes, further, reading, external, links, realism, univocity, being, individuation, formal, distinction, voluntarism, metaphysical, argument, for, the, existence, god, illuminationism, immaculate, conception, medieval, period, sixteenth, to, nineteenth, centuries, twentieth, century,

Text of the page (most frequently used words):
the (497), and (212), #scotus (189), duns (123), that (100), john (74), for (64), from (63), his (63), with (59), was (58), god (48), franciscan (46), philosophy (37), being (36), this (35), not (35), ordinatio (34), century (33), university (31), are (31), first (30), existence (30), which (30), oxford (29), thomas (27), edit (27), catholic (25), there (25), one (24), aristotle (23), argument (23), has (23), isbn (23), have (23), paris (21), metaphysics (21), aquinas (21), press (21), lectura (21), institute (20), 978 (20), can (20), theology (19), quaestiones (19), distinction (18), theory (18), univocity (18), publications (18), distinctiones (18), latin (17), philosophers (17), medieval (17), works (17), ibn (17), mary (17), wolter (17), but (17), been (17), possible (17), realism (16), peter (16), allan (16), ofm (16), exists (16), work (16), died (16), all (15), other (15), see (15), between (15), articles (14), encyclopedia (14), english (14), history (14), church (14), original (14), super (14), something (14), probably (14), about (13), pope (13), scottish (13), more (13), cambridge (13), necessary (13), liber (13), text (12), 2014 (12), paul (12), time (12), also (12), william (12), later (12), contingent (12), philosophical (11), knowledge (11), ethics (11), principle (11), things (11), early (11), were (11), known (11), its (11), argued (11), version (11), view (10), friars (10), theologians (10), 1308 (10), will (10), nature (10), lombard (10), bonaventure (10), divine (10), theological (10), williams (10), their (10), doctrine (10), commentary (10), immaculate (10), only (10), librum (10), conception (10), 1300 (10), such (10), wikipedia (9), different (9), retrieved (9), related (9), scotism (9), scholasticism (9), anselm (9), formal (9), just (9), 2005 (9), question (9), when (9), then (9), certain (9), than (9), therefore (9), book (9), would (9), translated (9), had (9), most (9), thing (9), two (9), edited (8), portal (8), form (8), cognition (8), virtue (8), physics (8), ockham (8), christian (8), doctor (8), haecceity (8), gregory (8), introduction (8), part (8), radical (8), those (8), nothing (8), properties (8), itself (8), proof (8), although (8), edition (8), reportatio (8), sententiarum (8), notes (8), questions (8), translation (8), sentences (8), whether (8), language (7), stanford (7), people (7), thought (7), essence (7), life (7), late (7), joseph (7), jean (7), henry (7), richard (7), voluntarism (7), scotistic (7), period (7), blessed (7), scotland (7), archived (7), 2006 (7), orthodoxy (7), into (7), who (7), metaphysical (7), another (7), way (7), given (7), because (7), called (7), new (7), november (7), lecture (7), contingency (7), what (7), lectures (7), books (7), well (7), cologne (7), sin (7), infinite (7), series (7), argues (7), main (7), same (7), may (6), september (6), categories (6), pages (6), links (6), written (6), writers (6), roman (6), 14th (6), 13th (6), any (6), truth (6), meaning (6), concept (6), school (6), rhetoric (6), virtues (6), conclusion (6), din (6), bacon (6), augustine (6), effect (6), ontological (6), primus (6), von (6), francis (6), johannes (6), general (6), article (6), 1993 (6), vos (6), according (6), philosopher (6), 2012 (6), march (6), vol (6), some (6), either (6), attributes (6), many (6), libros (6), actually (6), centuries (6), individuation (6), primo (6), principio (6), second (6), does (6), attributed (6), both (6), how (6), during (6), influence (6), against (6), produced (6), individual (6), toggle (5), under (5), site (5), page (5), last (5), category (5), sources (5), unsourced (5), sidebar (5), minor (5), augustinian (5), mind (5), future (5), suárez (5), descartes (5), boethius (5), soul (5), reality (5), property (5), physical (5), object (5), motion (5), matter (5), concepts (5), body (5), modern (5), thomism (5), alexander (5), death (5), causes (5), ideas (5), rome (5), robert (5), eriugena (5), cardinal (5), clement (5), benedict (5), maria (5), merton (5), jacques (5), bibliography (5), freedom (5), 2003 (5), 2002 (5), companion (5), subtle (5), account (5), opera (5), metaphysicam (5), com (5), dunce (5), england (5), q2b (5), now (5), even (5), however (5), example (5), end (5), needed (5), point (5), cause (5), 2004 (5), complete (5), opus (5), pdf (5), 1265 (5), these (5), could (5), them (5), interpretatione (5), 57659 (5), 1302 (5), thus (5), him (5), while (5), move (5), exist (5), common (5), real (5), contents (4), search (4), commons (4), citation (4), statements (4), december (4), wayback (4), british (4), april (4), venerated (4), scholars (4), beatified (4), scholastic (4), vatican (4), france (4), topics (4), treatise (4), human (4), malebranche (4), heidegger (4), avicenna (4), substantial (4), subject (4), ontology (4), abstract (4), commentaries (4), macintyre (4), newman (4), albertus (4), age (4), prior (4), natural (4), universals (4), intellect (4), four (4), abu (4), cusa (4), buridan (4), llull (4), ghent (4), bernard (4), saint (4), hugh (4), abelard (4), canterbury (4), alcuin (4), isidore (4), dionysius (4), quiddity (4), pascal (4), illumination (4), maritain (4), neo (4), henri (4), daniel (4), francisco (4), cross (4), reformation (4), middle (4), ages (4), primacy (4), scotists (4), 1950 (4), internet (4), media (4), 2016 (4), 1995 (4), 1982 (4), 1997 (4), eds (4), critical (4), del (4), reading (4), giorgio (4), pini (4), scoti (4), 2020 (4), religious (4), iii (4), cannot (4), authors (4), efficiency (4), change (4), still (4), perfect (4), claims (4), proved (4), efficient (4), writings (4), aristotelis (4), report (4), secundum (4), few (4), special (4), contemporary (4), claim (4), martin (4), washington (4), america (4), creatures (4), quartus (4), date (4), order (4), popular (4), rather (4), should (4), important (4), thinking (4), among (4), seventeenth (4), interest (4), sixteenth (4), used (4), reputation (4), left (4), followed (4), christ (4), feast (4), without (4), though (4), following (4), like (4), she (4), defended (4), believed (4), illuminationism (4), respect (4), they (4), volition (4), applied (4), thisness (4), opposed (4), hide (4), terms (3), using (3), you (3), wikimedia (3), use (3), 2026 (3), wikidata (3), title (3), set (3), wikisource (3), child (3), long (3), volume (3), lacking (3), references (3), august (3), 2019 (3), french (3), ecclesiastical (3), short (3), academics (3), aristotelian (3), academic (3), org (3), library (3), phenomenology (3), epistemology (3), kindi (3), averroes (3), anscombe (3), importance (3), ergo (3), anima (3), substance (3), free (3), dualism (3), adler (3), magnus (3), islamic (3), followers (3), old (3), sense (3), poetics (3), politics (3), analytics (3), logic (3), aristotelianism (3), renaissance (3), high (3), vincent (3), eckhart (3), siger (3), scot (3), grosseteste (3), victor (3), pseudo (3), double (3), disputation (3), actus (3), stein (3), rahner (3), erasmus (3), chesterton (3), molinism (3), humanism (3), salamanca (3), schools (3), social (3), xvi (3), hildebrand (3), johann (3), girard (3), edward (3), marcel (3), pierre (3), lagrange (3), giovanni (3), jesus (3), ávila (3), catherine (3), cyril (3), epistle (3), berwickshire (3), realist (3), group (3), machine (3), entry (3), westminster (3), difference (3), edinburgh (3), ingham (3), beth (3), csj (3), archa (3), verbi (3), subsidia (3), 2010 (3), 402 (3), proceedings (3), quadruple (3), congress (3), horan (3), 2011 (3), 2008 (3), west (3), true (3), doi (3), ashgate (3), orders (3), january (3), studies (3), news (3), jews (3), come (3), together (3), premise (3), follows (3), logicmuseum (3), arguments (3), october (3), considered (3), notion (3), find (3), alone (3), fact (3), mousavirad (3), defense (3), oxoniense (3), erfurt (3), isagoge (3), examined (3), 2000 (3), education (3), name (3), 2007 (3), three (3), nevertheless (3), several (3), advent (3), starting (3), college (3), virgin (3), revised (3), 1966 (3), tertium (3), theoremata (3), primum (3), after (3), printed (3), whose (3), editions (3), once (3), collationes (3), 1303 (3), summer (3), 1295 (3), before (3), recent (3), whom (3), univocally (3), since (3), over (3), seen (3), others (3), king (3), twentieth (3), able (3), poem (3), included (3), essentially (3), described (3), word (3), term (3), became (3), students (3), leading (3), divided (3), student (3), ancient (3), spiritual (3), holy (3), number (3), appears (3), stain (3), position (3), great (3), never (3), entities (3), possibility (3), else (3), regress (3), here (3), ordered (3), impossible (3), makes (3), finally (3), gives (3), relative (3), absolute (3), create (3), determinate (3), feature (3), personal (3), distinct (3), commonality (3), ens (3), logical (3), dating (3), around (3), versions (3), master (3), birth (3), friar (3), tools (3), subsection (3), add (2), topic (2), languages (2), table (2), statement (2), contact (2), privacy (2), policy (2), trademark (2), non (2), link (2), imdb (2), 1911 (2), britannica (2), spanish (2), cs1 (2), value (2), reliable (2), 2023 (2), containing (2), dates (2), 2024 (2), description (2), alumni (2), metaphysicians (2), critics (2), christians (2), priests (2), index (2), open (2), sweden (2), spain (2), italy (2), data (2), united (2), international (2), authority (2), self (2), interpretations (2), mechanics (2), world (2), representation (2), critique (2), pure (2), concerning (2), 270 (2), rerum (2), natura (2), 350 (2), notable (2), plato (2), newton (2), meinong (2), ghazali (2), deleuze (2), universal (2), type (2), relation (2), necessity (2), insight (2), information (2), idea (2), entity (2), cogito (2), sum (2), forms (2), determinism (2), paradox (2), views (2), transmission (2), brentano (2), maimonides (2), jewish (2), farabi (2), golden (2), rhodes (2), peripatetic (2), economics (2), heard (2), lost (2), sleep (2), parva (2), naturalia (2), generation (2), movement (2), organon (2), corpus (2), syllogism (2), rational (2), hylomorphism (2), differentia (2), interests (2), abd (2), baghdadi (2), razi (2), sijistani (2), solomon (2), venice (2), nicholas (2), albert (2), oresme (2), petrus (2), giles (2), meister (2), boetius (2), dacia (2), brabant (2), ramon (2), peckham (2), roger (2), michael (2), gundissalinus (2), hales (2), laon (2), seville (2), areopagite (2), hippo (2), fathers (2), catholicism (2), neoplatonism (2), seven (2), quinque (2), viae (2), axiom (2), occam (2), guardian (2), aevum (2), pico (2), maistre (2), krasicki (2), gassendi (2), ficino (2), chateaubriand (2), moderate (2), conceptualism (2), nominalism (2), cartesianism (2), occamism (2), augustinianism (2), teaching (2), personalism (2), law (2), probabilism (2), war (2), price (2), marion (2), heller (2), walter (2), gutiérrez (2), hans (2), rené (2), copleston (2), balthasar (2), emmanuel (2), mounier (2), lonergan (2), congar (2), day (2), lubac (2), guardini (2), marie (2), knox (2), gilson (2), garrigou (2), blondel (2), tommaso (2), giuseppe (2), rosmini (2), mennais (2), 19th (2), agnesi (2), louis (2), liguori (2), vico (2), fénelon (2), bossuet (2), sales (2), bellarmine (2), luis (2), molina (2), ignatius (2), vitoria (2), cajetan (2), anthony (2), padua (2), hildegard (2), berengar (2), roscellinus (2), paschasius (2), predestination (2), damascus (2), bede (2), maximus (2), climacus (2), alexandria (2), cassian (2), jerome (2), chrysostom (2), ambrose (2), nyssa (2), nazianzus (2), athanasius (2), cyprian (2), origen (2), tertullian (2), irenaeus (2), justin (2), figures (2), online (2), 1095 (2), 1266 (2), wikiquote (2), external (2), woo (2), hoon (2), journal (2), turretin (2), formulation (2), 1990 (2), 521 (2), goodness (2), living (2), dunces (2), fortress (2), postmodernity (2), andreas (2), theo (2), die (2), honderich (2), grenz (2), metaphysician (2), 968488 (2), 1998 (2), acts (2), third (2), further (2), literal (2), notabilia (2), biblioteca (2), 1996 (2), tvco (2), scoto (2), marenbon (2), wayne (2), hankey (2), douglas (2), hedley (2), deconstructing (2), postmodern (2), 1968 (2), différence (2), pre (2), escoto (2), typis (2), polyglottis (2), vaticanis (2), 1291 (2), 1991 (2), certainty (2), uncertain (2), forth (2), proceeds (2), prove (2), http (2), dhspriory (2), contragentiles1 (2), htm (2), give (2), established (2), shown (2), act (2), potency (2), extreme (2), realized (2), conclude (2), averroës (2), began (2), asserts (2), merely (2), july (2), seyyed (2), jaaber (2), jack (2), zupko (2), des (2), 1987 (2), 110 (2), medioevo (2), solution (2), riddle (2), philosophica (2), porphyrii (2), historia (2), vitae (2), mortis (2), discussion (2), 121 (2), bishop (2), vii (2), note (2), vorilong (2), prato (2), clericorum (2), ministri (2), aut (2), family (2), someone (2), 1301 (2), spade (2), often (2), 1347 (2), get (2), company (2), claimed (2), support (2), veldhuis (2), dekker (2), den (2), bok (2), texts (2), humans (2), 2001 (2), felix (2), alluntis (2), quodlibetal (2), oleg (2), bychkov (2), metaphysicorum (2), peri (2), hermeneias (2), elenchis (2), omnia (2), prologus (2), xii (2), tertius (2), viii (2), secundus (2), 1963 (2), distinctio (2), despite (2), longer (2), including (2), presents (2), separate (2), wadding (2), beginning (2), quodlibetales (2), parisiensis (2), 1305 (2), revision (2), 1304 (2), discovered (2), 1298 (2), perihermeneias (2), debate (2), vocation (2), played (2), years (2), criticism (2), particular (2), through (2), orthodox (2), semantic (2), thinkers (2), cite (2), pars (2), interpreted (2), compatible (2), abstracted (2), admits (2), 1960s (2), marked (2), particularly (2), significant (2), line (2), out (2), univocal (2), earlier (2), approach (2), developed (2), taking (2), major (2), development (2), various (2), today (2), came (2), 1245 (2), subtilis (2), received (2), secular (2), saw (2), calling (2), gerard (2), manley (2), hopkins (2), fifteenth (2), revival (2), franciscans (2), every (2), nineteenth (2), unexpected (2), behind (2), condition (2), confused (2), fourteenth (2), started (2), basis (2), veneration (2), underlying (2), merits (2), conceived (2), removed (2), east (2), need (2), beings (2), brought (2), instant (2), factual (2), instance (2), belongs (2), nor (2), agent (2), deals (2), infinity (2), begins (2), says (2), proposition (2), ascending (2), reached (2), usually (2), offered (2), understanding (2), must (2), arguing (2), implies (2), ultimate (2), intellectual (2), identical (2), very (2), gave (2), 1297 (2), 1299 (2), refute (2), everything (2), consider (2), tries (2), counterview (2), uses (2), fully (2), wills (2), opposite (2), least (2), reasons (2), himself (2), help (2), theologian (2), predicates (2), whereas (2), intermediate (2), conceptual (2), holds (2), inseparable (2), held (2), substances (2), purely (2), unity (2), existing (2), individuals (2), section (2), learn (2), material (2), power (2), creaturely (2), know (2), est (2), generally (2), logician (2), wrote (2), based (2), 1307 (2), consisting (2), recently (2), colonia (2), colophon (2), angels (2), complex (2), buried (2), lecturing (2), area (2), studium (2), philip (2), tradition (2), castle (2), where (2), born (2), region (2), lodge (2), kingdom (2), western (2), germany (2), appearance (2), upload (2), file (2), changes (2), read (2), log (2), donate (2), menu (2), mobile, cookie, statistics, developers, code, conduct, legal, safety, contacts, disclaimers, available, additional, apply, agree, registered, profit, organization, foundation, inc, creative, attribution, sharealike, license, rendered, parsoid, utc, hidden, incorporating, encyclopaedia, reference, 2025, webarchive, template, parameter, ipa, hcards, dmy, catholics, logicians, premature, burials, borders, commentators, mariologists, atheism, beatifications, staff, deaths, 1260s, births, https, php, duns_scotus, oldid, 1373954588, yale, lux, snac, idref, ddb, deutsche, biographie, trove, cinii, croatia, belgium, catalonia, finland, israel, poland, korea, greece, chile, latvia, norway, netherlands, portugal, czech, republic, bnf, states, national, worldcat, fast, gnd, viaf, isni, control, databases, teleology, space, psychology, meta, mereology, quantum, feminist, cosmology, axiology, 1981, simulacra, simulation, 1943, nothingness, 1927, 1846, concluding, unscientific, postscript, fragments, 1818, 1807, spirit, 1783, prolegomena, 1781, reason, 1714, monadology, 1710, principles, 1677, 1641, meditations, 1000, nijat, daneshnameh, alai, enneads, 200, nyāya, sūtras, timaeus, sophist, wolff, wittgenstein, whitehead, strawson, spinoza, schopenhauer, sartre, ryle, russell, reid, quine, putnam, proclus, plotinus, plantinga, peirce, parmenides, parfit, nietzsche, mozi, moore, lucretius, lotze, locke, lewis, leibniz, laozi, kripke, kierkegaard, kant, hume, hegel, dummett, davidson, collingwood, carnap, bolzano, berkeley, bergson, baudrillard, armstrong, unobservable, token, quality, qualia, perception, pattern, mental, linguistic, modality, intention, intelligence, identity, hypostatic, abstraction, experience, embodied, cosmos, causal, closure, causality, mundi, truthmaker, subjectivism, spiritualism, solipsism, scientific, relativism, pluralism, physicalism, phenomenalism, nihilism, naturalism, monism, materialism, liberty, libertarianism, idealism, existentialism, essentialism, enactivism, anti, action, theories, wheel, women, greek, classics, metabasis, mathematical, conimbricenses, nussbaum, hursthouse, rothbard, smith, foot, trendelenburg, cesar, cremonini, pietro, pomponazzi, jacopo, zabarella, averroism, avicennism, andronicus, erymneus, diodorus, tyre, critolaus, aristo, ceos, lyco, troas, strato, lampsacus, theophrastus, eudemus, dicaearchus, clearchus, soli, aristoxenus, magna, moralia, vices, situations, names, winds, problems, marvellous, physiognomonics, universe, melissus, xenophanes, gorgias, indivisible, lines, plants, colors, breath, pseudepigrapha, protrepticus, youth, respiration, length, shortness, divination, dreams, memory, sensibilia, constitution, athenians, eudemian, nicomachean, progression, parts, animals, meteorology, corruption, heavens, sophistical, refutations, posterior, interpretation, aristotelicum, chrematistics, tragic, hero, telos, peripeteia, opsis, mythos, mimesis, hamartia, diegesis, classical, unities, catharsis, anagnorisis, paradeigma, lexis, slavery, mixed, government, practical, pleonexia, phronesis, philia, nemesis, magnanimity, mean, eutrapelia, eudaimonia, arete, akrasia, animal, biology, unmoved, mover, sublunary, sphere, potentiality, actuality, passive, ousia, minima, hypokeimenon, horror, vacui, hexis, eternity, antiperistasis, active, accident, irrelevant, genus, contingents, apodicticity, lyceum, transmitted, overview, khaldun, taymiyya, qutb, shirazi, nafis, nasir, tusi, athir, abhari, latif, qazwini, arabi, rashid, fakhr, shahab, yahya, habash, suhrawardi, sab, rushd, tufayl, ayn, quzat, hamadani, bajjah, avempace, barakat, algazel, hazm, sina, kirmani, biruni, haytham, alhazen, miskawayh, sulayman, amiri, jabbar, masarra, qub, alpharabius, matta, yunus, ikhwan, safa, brethren, purity, bakr, rhazes, alkindus, nazzam, jabir, hayyan, geber, albo, hasdai, crescas, gersonides, nachmanides, abraham, daud, judah, halevi, gabirol, saadia, gaon, isaac, israeli, ben, hennon, lambertus, monte, ferrer, francesc, eiximenis, saxony, nicole, marsilius, inghen, aureolus, durandus, godfrey, fontaines, peregrinus, maricourt, vitello, sava, serbia, alain, lille, gilbert, porrée, dominicus, chartres, roscelin, alberic, 12th, cassiodorus, empiricism, rationalism, platonism, utopia, irenaean, theodicy, deadly, sins, rota, fortunae, wager, razor, memento, mori, infused, righteousness, homo, unius, libri, head, pin, angel, evil, demon, dehellenization, cartesian, values, purus, essendi, wojtyła, scheler, ratzinger, montaigne, foundationalism, intellectualism, analytical, mortgage, option, poor, command, scott, hahn, aidan, nichols, tomáš, halík, luc, kreeft, michał, raniero, cantalamessa, kasper, alasdair, gustavo, carlo, martini, alice, 21st, nouwen, vanier, baptist, metz, küng, schillebeeckx, alfred, delp, frederick, lefebvre, urs, daniélou, yves, karl, nouvelle, théologie, josemaría, escrivá, guitton, rops, dorothy, fulton, sheen, edith, romano, dominique, chenu, gabriel, dietrich, georges, bernanos, ronald, étienne, teilhard, chardin, maréchal, reginald, 20th, thérèse, lisieux, maurice, george, tyrrell, vladimir, solovyov, friedrich, hügel, désiré, mercier, léon, bloy, modernism, émile, boutroux, matthias, scheeben, zigliara, hergenröther, pecci, wilhelm, freiherr, ketteler, cornoldi, gaetano, sanseverino, jaime, balmes, lacordaire, ignaz, döllinger, antonio, luigi, taparelli, félicité, görres, bruno, lanteri, hofbauer, sailer, alfonso, muzzarelli, gaetana, montfort, alphonsus, giambattista, nicolas, blaise, jansenism, cornelius, jansen, françois, bénigne, thomassin, olier, antónio, vieira, ágreda, bérulle, campanella, revolution, baroque, lawrence, brindisi, canisius, león, teresa, xavier, osuna, loyola, villanova, eck, fisher, counter, della, mirandola, girolamo, savonarola, marsilio, kempis, julian, norwich, devotio, moderna, geert, groote, heinrich, seuse, cloud, unknowing, hilton, tauler, bridget, siena, ruusbroec, rolle, dante, alighieri, reforms, mysticism, beatrice, nazareth, assisi, dominic, guzmán, bingen, clairvaux, decretum, gratiani, joachim, fiore, damian, tours, narek, radbertus, rabanus, maurus, nursia, aniane, paulinus, aquileia, disputes, transubstantiation, dispute, iconoclasm, ecthesis, monothelitism, confessor, leo, chrysologus, orosius, basil, caesarea, jerusalem, hilary, poitiers, ephrem, syrian, monophysitism, nestorianism, pelagianism, arianism, eusebius, constantine, novatian, montanism, diognetus, martyr, aristides, athens, shepherd, hermas, barnabas, polycarp, antioch, didache, biblical, canon, vulgate, bible, ecumenical, councils, papal, papacy, timeline, key, resolution, images, jpg, tiff, format, galleries, science, collections, oklahoma, libraries, local, birthplace, parthenius, minges, center, annotated, research, utrecht, tobias, hoffmann, february, commission, 429049174, oclc, 5054, issn, zalta, hall, jeffrey, hause, quotations, author, 249, selected, essays, neil, blane, architect, iuthaca, cornell, 63563, antonie, 7486, 2462, shannon, ethical, stump, eleonore, 36933, pinborg, jan, kenny, kretzmann, norman, harmony, mutuality, moral, bychkof, olef, 10213, honnefelder, ludger, möhle, hannes, speer, kobusch, bullido, barrio, susana, 10215, philosophischen, perspektiven, seines, werkes, investigations

Text of the page (random words):
challenged and removed find sources duns scotus news newspapers books scholar jstor august 2026 learn how and when to remove this message scotus elaborates a distinct view on hylomorphism with three important strong theses that differentiate him he held 1 that there exists matter that has no form whatsoever or prime matter as the stuff underlying all change against aquinas cf his quaestiones in metaphysicam 7 q 5 lectura 2 d 12 q un 2 that not all created substances are composites of form and matter cf lectura 2 d 12 q un n 55 that is that purely spiritual substances do exist and 3 that one and the same substance can have more than one substantial form for instance humans have at least two substantial forms the soul and the form of the body forma corporeitas cf ordinatio 4 d 11 q 3 n 54 he argued for an original principle of individuation cf ordinatio 2 d 3 pars 1 qq 1 6 the haecceity as the ultimate unity of a unique individual haecceitas an entity s thisness as opposed to the common nature natura communis feature existing in any number of individuals for scotus the axiom stating that only the individual exists is a dominating principle of the understanding of reality for the apprehension of individuals an intuitive cognition is required which gives us the present existence or the non existence of an individual as opposed to abstract cognition thus the human soul in its separated state from the body will be capable of knowing the spiritual intuitively formal distinction edit like other realist philosophers of the period such as aquinas and henry of ghent scotus recognised the need for an intermediate distinction that was not merely conceptual but not fully real or mind dependent either scotus argued for a formal distinction distinctio formalis a parte rei which holds between entities which are inseparable and indistinct in reality but whose definitions are not identical for example the personal properties of the trinity are formally distinct from the divine essence similarly the distinction between the thisness or haecceity of a thing is intermediate between a real and a conceptual distinction 32 there is also a formal distinction between the divine attributes and the powers of the soul theology edit part of a series on catholic philosophy augustine aquinas and scotus ethics cardinal virtues just price just war principle of double effect casuistry probabilism natural law personalism social teaching liberation theology christian humanism virtue ethics works of mercy metaphysics conceptualism realism moderate realism nominalism quiddity essence nature haecceity quinque viae predestination theological determinism compatibilism divine attributes schools augustinianism victorines lullism cartesianism christian neoplatonism friends of god molinism ressourcement occamism scholasticism second neo scotism thomism analytic salamanca philosophers ancient ambrose athenagoras athanasius augustine benedict boethius clement cyprian cyril gregory of nazianzus gregory of nyssa irenaeus jerome cassian chrysostom climacus john of damascus justin maximus dionysius origen paul tertullian medieval abelard albert alcuin alexander anselm autrecourt aquinas bacon bede berengar bernard bonaventure buridan catherine cusa eckhart eriugena giles gregory i grosseteste gundissalinus hildegard hugh isidore llull lombard martin ockham oresme paschasius roscellinus scotus siger symeon thierry modern agnesi arnauld ávila azpilcueta bellarmine bossuet brentano botero cajetan chateaubriand cortés descartes erasmus fénelon gracián kołłątaj krasicki la mennais liguori maistre malebranche mariana meinong mercado molina more newman pascal rosmini sales soto suárez vico vitoria caramuel contemporary adler anscombe balthasar barron benedict xvi belloc blondel brown chesterton congar copleston finnis garrigou lagrange geach gilson girard gutiérrez guardini heller haldane hildebrand illich john paul ii lonergan lubac macintyre marcel marion maritain mcluhan mounier murray pieper rahner rescher stein taylor catholic church portal philosophy portal v t e voluntarism edit scotus was an augustinian franciscan theologian 33 he is usually associated with theological voluntarism the tendency to emphasize god s will and human freedom in all philosophical issues the main difference between aquinas s rational theology and that of scotus is that scotus believed certain predicates may be applied univocally with exactly the same meaning to god and creatures whereas aquinas insisted that this is impossible and that only analogical predication can be employed in which a word as applied to god has a meaning different from although related to the meaning of that same word as applied to creatures scotus demonstrated his doctrine most forcefully in his ordinatio scotus gave the lecture lectura i 39 during 1297 1299 to refute the view that everything is necessary and immutable he claims that the aim of this lecture has two points lectura i 39 31 first to consider the contingency in what is de contingentia in entibus second to consider how god s certain knowledge is compatible with the contingency of things scotus tries to defend the validity of christian theology against the attack of ancient philosophers the main argument is unpacked in lectura i 39 49 53 scotus argues that a necessary being god is able to have contingent knowledge and that although this knowledge is contingent it is not necessarily mutable and temporal by that very fact in lectura i 39 1 scotus asks whether god has determinate knowledge of things according to every aspect of their existence as according to being in the future he presents a counterview which claims that god cannot have determinate knowledge of the future to support this counterview he uses aristotle s de interpretatione ix in the following arguments scotus does not attempt to contradict aristotle he does not affirm or reject the ideas of aristotle the only issue he argues against is the proposition that god cannot have determinate knowledge of the future scotus appears to try to fully demonstrate that aristotle s text is not contradictory to the christian doctrine of god scotus argues that god wills with one single volition unica volitione whatever he wills god has one volition ad intra but this one volition can be related to many opposite things ad extra god can simultaneously will one thing at time 1 and the opposite thing at time 2 there are various possible interpretations of aristotle s de interpretatione ix for example john buridan ca 1300 1362 thought the scotistic contingency theory was an aristotelian view buridan s judgment is all the more possible because of at least four reasons 1 aristotle s de interpretatione ix 19a23 25 can be interpreted like the scotistic contingency theory 2 scotus himself does not refute aristotle s de interpretatione ix in lectura i 39 49 53 3 scotus rather tries to formulate his contingency theory with the help of other works of aristotle in lectura i 39 51 54 4 scotus introduces the diachronic feature of god s volition to his contingency theory as well as the synchronic feature 34 metaphysical argument for the existence of god edit duns scotus argued that it is better to construct a metaphysical argument for the existence of god rather than the more common physical argument from motion 35 favoured by aquinas 36 following aristotle 37 though the version in de primo principio is the most complete and final version the ordinatio proof is usually offered however the de primo version gives a wider understanding of the argument as well as scotus s metaphysical underpinnings for his argument for god s existence but the ordinatio version will be followed here briefly scotus begins his proof by explaining that there are two angles we must take in arguing for the existence of an actually infinite being first from the view of the relative properties of god and second from the absolute properties of god relative properties are those which are predicable of god in relation to creation absolute properties are those which belong to god whether or not he chose to create under the first heading of relative properties scotus argues for a triple primacy of efficiency finality and pre eminence from there he shows that one primacy implies the others and finally there can only be one nature that is the first efficient cause ultimate end and the most perfect nature from there the subtle doctor discusses the absolute properties of god the first being is intellectual and volitional and the intellect and will are identical with the essence of this supreme nature the first being is also infinite being while discussing the infinity of god scotus resurrects anselm s argument and responds to the criticism that anselm makes an illicit leap from concept to reality finally he gives a definite answer of yes to the question of whether there exists an actually infinite being the very next question of the ordinatio deals with the unicity of the nature thus proved to exist however the de primo principio version concludes with this argument the proof for the conclusion that some efficient cause is simply first such that neither can it be an effect nor can it by virtue of something other than itself cause an effect ordinatio i 2 43 38 runs like this something can be produced it is produced either by itself nothing or another not by nothing for nothing causes nothing not by itself for an effect never causes itself therefore by another call it a if a is first then we have reached the conclusion if a is not first but also an effect we return to 2 a is produced either by itself nothing or another from 3 and 4 we say another b the ascending series will either continue infinitely or we finally reach something which has nothing prior to it an infinite ascending series is impossible therefore etc scotus acknowledges two objections and deals with them accordingly first is that he begs the question in assuming a first in the series here he argues that while many admit an infinite regress in an accidentally ordered series of causes no philosopher admits infinite regress in an essentially ordered series scotus explains the differences between the two and offers proofs for the conclusion that an infinity of essentially ordered causes in a series is impossible 39 second it is objected that his proof is not really a demonstration since it begins with a contingent premise that something is produced is contingent and not necessary therefore the proof proceeds from a contingent and not a necessary premise scotus says that while that is true it is utterly manifest that things are produced or effected but in order to respond scotus makes a modal move and reworks the argument now he argues from the possibility of production it is possible that something can be produced is a necessary proposition from there he is able to conclude that it is possible that the first efficient cause exists and if it is possible that it exists then it does exist he asserts that the last claim will be proved later in the argument 40 in the lectura proof scotus argues the following way although beings different from god are actually contingent with respect to their factual existence nevertheless they are not with respect to their possible existence hence those entities which are called contingent with respect to their factual existence are necessary with respect to their possible existence for instance although there exists a man is contingent nevertheless it is possible that he exists is necessary because his existence does not include any contradiction therefore something different from god is possible is necessary because being is divided into the contingent and the necessary just as necessity belongs to a necessary being in virtue of its condition or its quiddity so possibility belongs to a possible being in virtue of its quiddity if the first argument is alternatively qualified with the notion of ontological possibility then we have necessary propositions as follows it is possible that there is something different from god it is not of itself because then it would not be the case that it were possible nor from nothing therefore it is possible that it is from something else either it is possible that the other agent acts by virtue of itself and not by virtue of something else not being from something else or it is not possible if so then it is possible that there is a first agent and if it is possible that it exists then it exists just as we have proved before if not and if there is no infinite regress then the argument at once comes to a standstill for more on this argument see especially authors duns scotus ordinatio ordinatio i d2 q2b 41 illuminationism edit scotus argued against the version of illuminationism that had been defended earlier in the century by henry of ghent in his ordinatio i 3 1 4 he argued against the sceptical consequences that henry claimed would follow from abandoning divine illumination scotus argued that if our thinking were fallible in the way henry had believed such illumination could not even in principle ensure certain and pure knowledge 42 43 immaculate conception edit perhaps the most influential point of duns scotus s theology was his defense of the immaculate conception of mary i e that mary herself was conceived without sin at the time there was a great deal of argument about the subject the general opinion was that it was appropriately deferential to the mother of god but it could not be seen how to resolve the problem that only with christ s death would the stain of original sin be removed the great philosophers and theologians of the west were divided on the subject indeed even thomas aquinas sided with those who denied the doctrine the feast day had existed in the east though in the east the feast is just of the conception of mary since the seventh century and had been introduced in several dioceses in the west as well even though the philosophical basis was lacking citing anselm of canterbury s principle potuit decuit ergo fecit he i e god could do it it was appropriate therefore he did it duns scotus devised the following argument mary was in need of redemption like all other human beings but through the merits of jesus crucifixion given in advance she was conceived without the stain of original sin god could have brought it about 1 that she was never in original sin 2 she was in sin only for an instant 3 she was in sin for a period of time being purged at the last instant whichever of these options was most excellent should probably be attributed to mary 44 this apparently careful statement provoked a storm of opposition at paris and suggested the line fired france for mary without spot in the famous poem duns scotus s oxford by gerard manley hopkins scotus s argument appears in pope pius ix s 1854 declaration of the dogma of the immaculate conception at the first moment of her conception mary was preserved free from the stain of original ...